Syria has experienced a fierce civil war since 2011 between the Syrian regime, which was supported by Iran, Russia, Hezbollah and other Shiite militias, and opposition forces that were mainly supported by Turkey and the United States until 2017. In December 2024, the Syrian opposition succeeded in overthrowing the Syrian regime, declaring the end of the Assad’s family rule that persisted for more than 50 years. What will the new Syria look like is currently difficult to imagine as large parts of the country are destroyed, there is no national army, and millions of Syrians have been internally and externally displaced. The most pressing challenge that arises after the fall of the Assad regime is the formation of a transitional government that would rule the country in the short term.   While there is no clear information on the duration of this transitional period, the main objective of the new government would be preparing the country for presidential and parliamentary elections, the formation a national army, dissolving militias, and restoring sovereignty over areas controlled by the U.S. backed Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces in the east of Syria. The transitional government will also be tasked with conducting reconciliation between societal factions, especially the Sunnis and Alawites, which have spent more than a decade fighting each other. This would require a delicate balancing act, involving various factions with differing ideologies and ambitions. The inclusion of all relevant stakeholders, including representatives from the Syrian opposition, civil society, and potentially even certain elements of the Assad regime, would be crucial for ensuring broad legitimacy for the new government. However, this would also necessitate difficult compromises and power-sharing arrangements, which could prove contentious, as many influential armed groups have their own agendas that might oppose the national agenda of the forthcoming transitional government.   The new government will be required to build efficient administrative system to deliver high quality services to citizens, including education, water, electricity, and health services. Bringing refugees from the host countries is another challenge for the new government as the vast majority of those refugees, especially those living in Europe, would only return to Syria if the country stabilises. Additionally, addressing the deep-seated economic problems that have existed before the war, such as corruption and unemployment, would be essential for long-term stability.   The process of reconstructing the destroyed cities, such as Aleppo, Hama, and Homs are another challenge. The war has caused widespread damage to homes, schools, hospitals, and essential services. Rebuilding these would require substantial financial resources and technical expertise, both of which may be in short supply. So far, the European Union has expressed its willingness to participate in helping Syria reconstruct its destroyed cities, attempting to create a safe atmosphere to send refugees back to Syria, hence removing a heavy burden that has impacted European politics for more than a decade. It is also expected that Turkey, the main military sponsor of the opposition armed groups, will participate in the process of reconstructing Syria, attempting to solidify its influence in the fragile country. Many Arab countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia will be willing to participate in the process of rebuilding Syria, in an attempt to both maximise economic benefits while preserving their political influence.   The issue of accountability would also be highly complex. The Syrian people have suffered immensely, and many are eager to see those responsible for atrocities held accountable. However, pursuing justice while avoiding further division and conflict would be a delicate task. Establishing a truth and reconciliation commission could be one approach, but it would need to be designed carefully to address the needs of victims and perpetrators alike.   The role of regional and international actors would also be crucial in shaping Syria's future. Countries like Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the U.S. have all played significant roles in the conflict. However, following the fall of Assad’s regime not all of these countries, especially Iran and Russia, have the same level of influence. However, their role might be needed as they can exert some influence over certain societal groups in Syria. For instance, Russia can still influence the Kurds while Iran can exert influence on the Alawites and Shiaa in Syria. However, the divergent interests of major foreign competing agendas could complicate efforts to rebuild the country.   There is also another threat arising from the Israeli aggression beyond the Alpha Line that separates the occupied Syrian Golan Heights from Israel. On Dec. 9 2024, Israel conducted 100 airstrikes on civil and military positions in Syria, attempting to undermine the functionality of the incoming government. Whether Israel intends to retreat from the Alpha Line or not is another challenge for the new government that will be under perpetual pressure to retaliate despite not having the necessary military tools to counter or deter Israel.   The ability of the new transitional government to counter all the above-mentioned challenges depends on two pillars: building a new national army and reconciling societal factions. It would be challenging for any new government to contain the role of militias, as Islamists led by Hayat Tahrir Al Sham played the main role in the recent offensive that took the Assad regime down while the Syrian National Army has been prepared by Turkey to take a major role in the post-Assad era. Coordination between these two main factions can maintain peace and help the new transitional government deter challenges, while further confrontation will tear the country part.   To conclude, Syria's future depends on the ability of the transitional government to foster national unity, rebuild essential infrastructure, and navigate complex international dynamics. Success depends on balancing reconciliation with justice, managing foreign influences, and forming a cohesive national army to ensure stability.

The dream of Greater Israel is not fictional but real, first developed by Theodore Hertzel, the founding father of Zionism, Greater Israel include all lands from the Nile in Egypt to the Euphrates in Iraq. This includes territories from Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, all Jordanian territory, and all historical Palestine. In 2017, the United Nations issued a report indicating that Israel is proceeding with its plans to annex Palestinian lands in the West Bank while keeping Palestinians in severe conditions of isolation and deprivation. Moreover, soldiers of the Israeli army have worn badges showing Greater Israel during military operations in Gaza, indicating that Israel might expand its military operations in the Middle East after ending its military operations in Gaza. The pathway to accomplishing the dream of Greater Israel began in November 2024 when Israel entered the demilitarised zone that separates the occupied Syrian Golan Heights. In this area, Israel began establishing a construction project, paving a road along the borders with Syria. What if the Israeli construction project in Syria is the first step to build a corridor that would connect Israel to the Euphrates, thus making Israel closer to achieve the dream of Greater Israel? What will be the consequences if Israel manages to create this corridor?

Turkey has been working on developing its locally-manufactured military capabilities, including drones, for decades, attempting to present itself as a new rising regional power that can affect global politics. Turkey also recognised the importance of drones in supporting ground forces through providing air monitoring services and collecting intelligence about the Kurdistan Working Party (PKK), maximising its motivation to develop locally-made drones. Moreover, due to lack limitations on importing technology from Western powers that share contradictive perspectives with Turkey over issues of refugees, and the Syrian and Libyan Civil Wars. Ankara has paid deep attention to developing its Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), which are publicly known as drones, trying to fill the void of not possessing advanced aircraft such as F-22 or F-35. This analysis explores the different reasons that motivated Turkey to develop UAVs along with the benefits and challenges the Turkish diplomacy experienced.

China is known for using its economic power to infiltrate developing countries, especially those experiencing economic shocks, through providing unconditional loans and increasing its investments in infrastructure. Moreover, China avoids the risk of investing in fragile countries or countries torn out by civil wars, as it might not be a safe environment for long-term investments. In Libya, China has maintained the same policy and avoided playing a crucial role in affecting the outcomes of the Libyan conflict. It, however, preferred to maintain a strong connection with the different local parties engaged in this conflict to preserve its interests and ensure having an economic role in the future of the country. This analysis is going to deeply explore the Chinese role in Libya along with future prospects.

Turkey has a deep interest in the Horn of Africa and considers it as the gate to the East of the continent. Since 2011, Turkey has increased its humanitarian aid to Somalia, signed military and economic agreements and contributed to the process of state-building through allowing its companies to construct infrastructure, schools, hospital, and governmental premises. In 2017, Turkey has opened the largest military base, known as TURKSOM, beyond its borders to fully qualify the Somali army to deter the threat arising from the Al-Shabab movement that has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States (U.S.) since 2008.   In February 2024, Turkey signed significant military and economic agreements with Somalia, allowing it to a key player in the politics of Horn of Africa. According to the 10-year pact, Turkey will help Somalia to defend its maritime against piracy, smuggling, and foreign intervention from Ethiopia. Turkey is also obliged by the terms of this agreement to train and rebuild the Somali naval forces. The process of rebuilding includes weaponizing the Somali naval forces with Turkish weapons manufactured locally. These weapons include frigates built mainly for the Somali navy, which means that the Turkish military exports will witness an increase of demand on its products in the forthcoming years. This would motivate other countries to buy Turkish weapons, especially if Turkish weapons proved its efficiency in securing Somali maritime. These agreements also enable Turkey to work on extracting natural resources from the Somali territorial water in return for an agreed-upon percentage for Turkey. Some reports revealed that Turkey will receive 30% of the revenues of the Somali economic zone. Somali airspace will also be fully opened for Turkish military use. This analysis explores Turkish motivations of signing this agreement and the challenges that it might confront while implementing it.

In a move with significant political and economic implications, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi embarked on an official visit to Ankara Sept. 4, 2024. This highly anticipated visit comes months after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to Egypt earlier this year and his invitation to President El-Sisi to Ankara. The current visit, considered a turning point in Egyptian-Turkish relations, aims to strengthen bilateral cooperation and open new avenues for coordination on regional and international issues. After a decade of tension and estrangement in the relations between Egypt and Turkey.   The Egyptian President's visit to Turkey is of special importance, as it is the culmination of a long phase of discussions aimed at restoring relations between Egypt and Turkey to their normal course. The rounds of talks and meetings concluded with Erdogan's visit to Cairo last February, which witnessed the announcement of the revival of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council for relations between the two countries in its new form, where both leaders co-chair the first meeting of the Council. The meeting also involved a comprehensive review of the Egyptian-Turkish bilateral relations and discussions on potential steps to further enhance the Egyptian-Turkish cooperation.   This analysis highlights the motivations of this visit and its implications on regional and Turkish politics.