Restoring Balance: Impacts of Automation on UAE Labour Force

The Kurdish dream of establishing an independent state was on the verge of realisation after centuries of demands in Jan. 1946. This came when “Qazi Mohammad,” the Iranian Kurdish leader, declared the establishment of the Mahabad Republic in the province of the same name, now part of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, this dream quickly dissipated when the Soviet Union withdrew its financial support for the nascent state. The intensification of the economic blockade on the region further compounded the situation, preventing the entry of food supplies and reducing agricultural production. These pressures led to dramatic shifts in the loyalties of Kurdish tribal leaders who had initially allied with “Qazi” during the state's formation, hoping to secure a share of Soviet financial and food aid.   The food situation worsened over time, pushing some leaders of the Mahabad army to leave the capital, especially as Iranian forces were nearing its entrance, leaving the Kurdish leader and a small Kurdish group behind to face an unequal battle with the Iranian army. Therefore, to spare Kurdish blood, it was decided to surrender on December 15 of the same year, leading to the Iranian army's occupation of Mahabad and the declaration of the state's fall. In the end, “Qazi” was executed in March 1947, marking the end of the closest attempt to establish a Kurdish state.   About a quarter of a century later, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court issued a series of rulings regarding Iraqi oil exported by the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The latest ruling, issued in Feb. 2024, mandated the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Council of Ministers to hand over all oil and non-oil revenues to the central government in Baghdad. This could have a dual impact similar to that caused by the cessation of financial support and the Iranian blockade on the Mahabad army, but this time it affects the Peshmerga forces that represent the hope for preserving the “autonomy” of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq considered the second closest Kurdish attempt at establishing a national homeland for the Kurds.   Therefore, the First Part of this paper addresses the political situation of the Kurds, focusing on the status of the region in the Iraqi Constitution, the contentious issues between the region and the federal government, and the impact of these disputes on the continuity and existence of the Peshmerga. The Second Part reviews the economic situation, examining the effects of the series of judicial rulings on the conditions that undermine the autonomy of the regional government in selling oil and the repercussions of this on the Peshmerga as a Kurdish defence force that protects the “autonomy” of the region, forming the last line of defence against its collapse.

China has mediated a Palestinian reconciliation dialogue in Beijing, and has succeeded in bridging the rift between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These steps indicate a change in China's approach to the Middle East, as it has become an active player in the region by expanding its policies to include political and strategic considerations, in addition to its energy interests. Its "non-interventionist" policy has attracted many countries in the region, which see their growing relations with Beijing as a means of diversification. However, China's increasing involvement may pose a threat to US interests in the region. As Washington has increasingly focused on the Indo-Pacific region, China has emerged as an active player in the Middle East, reshaping regional security dynamics, signing strategic partnerships and memoranda of understanding for its economic activities with most Middle Eastern countries, and strengthening its ties with various regional organizations over the past two decades. Recent Chinese diplomatic initiatives demonstrate Beijing’s deep investment in further developing relations with Middle Eastern countries, with Beijing hosting the Arab-Chinese Summit and the Gulf-China Summit, demonstrating its commitment to strengthening strategic partnerships among the region’s countries and promoting economic development beyond its traditional energy interests. China’s growing engagement in the Middle East is seen as a significant factor shaping the region’s geopolitical landscape and has significant implications for global politics. This raises the question: how China’s methods diverge from those of the United States (U.S.) in the region?

The world has been on edge since July 31,2024, awaiting Iran’s response to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, head of the Hamas political bureau, in Tehran by an Israeli attack. Haniyeh was targeted while attending the inauguration ceremony of Iranian President Masoud Pezekshian, marking a direct challenge to Iranian sovereignty and its role as a regional leader of resistance movements. This event underscores the broader confrontation between Iran, which opposes what it perceives as the United States and Israeli dominance in the region. Given the assassination's symbolic and strategic significance, many see Iran’s retaliation as inevitable, particularly amid escalations between Israel and Iran. Notably, this incident is part of a broader series of high-profile killings targeting figures within the so-called resistance axis. Just hours before the explosion in Tehran, Israel launched a missile strike in Beirut's southern suburbs, killing Fouad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah military official, while also claiming—without confirmation—the assassination of Mohammed Deif, a leading Hamas military commander.   While consensus exists regarding the certainty of an Iranian response, there is sharp debate within political and military circles over the nature of this retaliation. The targeted nature of the Israeli strikes suggests that a direct and immediate Iranian response may be needed to restore its deterrent credibility. However, Iran’s extensive network of regional proxies presents an alternative, allowing Tehran to retaliate indirectly while avoiding the military and economic costs of direct confrontation. This calculation has become more critical following the U.S.’s declaration that it would militarily defend Israel against any Iranian attack, reaffirming its earlier stance on Iranian missile strikes against Israel in April.   Predicting the nature of Iran’s response can be facilitated by examining the pattern of its previous reactions to similar attacks, particularly given Iran’s long history of confrontations following the 1979 revolution and its enduring hostility toward the U.S. Among these conflicts, the one most analogous to the current situation is the so-called Tanker War, which took place between Iran and Iraq from 1984 to 1988. Iran successfully drew the U.S. into a large-scale military engagement in the Arabian Gulf during this period. This scenario holds significant parallels to today’s tensions, as will be detailed later.   This paper, therefore, aims to analyse the similarities and differences between Iran’s current posture and its stance during the Tanker War from multiple perspectives—military, political, and economic—both internally externally. By comparing the dynamics at play, including the role of the U.S. in both scenarios, this analysis seeks to clarify what can be expected from Iran in light of these combined variables.

A recent statement from the European Union Foreign Policy Commissioner, Josep Borrell, urging Israel's allies, notably Washington, to cease supplying weapons to Israel has ignited widespread controversy. This call comes amid heightened concerns over the significant civilian deaths in the Gaza Strip. Coinciding with this plea, a Dutch appeals court decision has prohibited the export of all spare parts for F-35 fighter jets destined for Israel. These developments unfold against the backdrop of Israel's plans to initiate an expanded military operation in Rafah. Such an operation raises the spectre of a potential humanitarian catastrophe, particularly concerning the over 1.3 million displaced individuals from the Gaza Strip who have sought refuge in Rafah since the commencement of military activities in the enclave.   The United States provides Israel with annual military aid worth $3.8 billion, which stands as one of the most substantial military aid packages supplied by the U.S. to any country globally. This commitment was reaffirmed by U.S. officials, including President Joseph Biden, who, during his tenure as Vice President under Barack Obama, emphasised the enduring strategic alliance between the two countries. Then Vice President Biden said the U.S. commitment to Israel transcends moral obligations and is a deeply rooted strategic obligation. During a visit to Tel Aviv amid the events of Oct. 7, he underscored that “the existence of an independent and secure Israel within globally recognised borders aligns with the practical strategic interests of the United States.” He further emphasised, “I have long said: If Israel didn't exist, we would have to invent it.” Evidence of the depth of relations and continued support is further demonstrated by Congress' approval of an additional $14.1 billion in military aid to Israel. This aid is intended to bolster Israel's capabilities in its conflict with the Hamas movement, specifically by providing air and missile defence support and replenishing U.S. military stock granted to Israel. This level of support echoes the assistance provided by the United States to Israel during the October 1973 War with the Egyptian Army.   The generous and unconditional support provided by the U.S. to Israel prompts numerous inquiries, particularly in the context of the U.S.'s inability to exert pressure on Israel to stop its war on Gaza. Additionally, its loss of control over the right-wing government's decision-making process regarding the potential expansion of the war to include Rafah, portending an imminent conflict with Egypt. Hence, this analysis endeavours to address a pivotal question: Will these developments prompt a shift in the U.S. stance toward Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing government, potentially leading to a withdrawal from the notion of an expanded operation in Rafah? Furthermore, can the United States feasibly cease its military aid to this strategic ally in the Middle East?

Amidst the intricate tapestry of our contemporary world, we find ourselves living in a “world of risks” and existential threats that are escalating faster than our capacity for response and remedy. As a result of our tendency to fixate on addressing the ever-growing number of issues that our societies face, we often neglect the importance of envisioning future risks and their potential consequences for human survival and growth.   The significance of future studies and early warning systems transcends the mere scope of risk mitigation and preparedness. It encompasses an ethical obligation to the forthcoming generations an obligation to plant the seeds for a future we ourselves may not see, but one we bestow as an enduring legacy. This form of responsibility, some may even say “altruism”, manifests clearly in the work of those who are dedicated to this field of research. As we recognise the pitfalls of short-sightedness, especially in recent years where questions about the future are infinite, we also acknowledge this as an opportunity to study and improve our approach to the future.   In this inaugural issue of Futurescapes, Al Habtoor Research Centre unveils a meticulously crafted “early warning” on the looming spectre of misusing artificial intelligence capabilities. Within the pages of this publication, we have committed our unwavering focus to confront this critical turning point spurred by expanding technological capacities and the potential relinquishment of human control over these very capacities. In an era where scientists and scholars are impelled to develop AI systems that transcend their conventional roles of aiding and empowering humanity, a growing unease takes root: the potential for these systems to transcend their limitations and penetrate the intricate realms of emotion and distinctly human tasks. Thus, an alternate trajectory unfurls — one that goes beyond traditional automation, aspiring to metamorphose humans into remotely guided automatons.   Within the pages of this issue, we delve into the transformation of robots into entities evocative of human traits and the simultaneous mechanisation of human functions. Furthermore, we explore other pivotal themes, venturing into uncharted landscapes and unconventional dimensions to imagine different potential futures in the new era of AI.

One of the most critical issues currently facing the Middle East is the changing composition of its demographic structure. A massive cohort of young people — known as a youth bulge — is challenging policymakers, with youth policies affecting security, education, the labour market, and welfare programs, among other areas. Given the relative stability and wealth of the Gulf states, this is an issue that is not often associated with the region. However, handling a growing young population is just as challenging in the Gulf.   The Gulf is one of the wealthiest regions worldwide; in terms of GDP per capita, it is distinctive due to its unique hydrocarbon reserves compared to a relatively small national population. Gulf states rely on oil revenue — to varying degrees — to attract private investors and provide extensive public services and subsidies to nationals. With not enough diversification in their economies, government spending in the Gulf states will continue to be a barrier to economic diversification. To sustain the high standard of living attained by Emirati and Saudi societies to the youth and the coming generations, the two countries must set strategies and plans to integrate youth while continuing to diversify their economies away from oil. This study explores the impact of the post-oil reforms and strategy on the youth, including education, employment, social contract, and identity.   The study applies Late Rentier State Theory to analyse the relationship between youth, the Emirati and Saudi states, the post-oil reforms, and their future trajectories. The analysis is guided by some of the characteristics identified by Late RST which focus on the impact of globalization, modernization policies, diversification, the state’s encouragement of entrepreneurship, and the sustainability of their strategies with regards to the extent to which they accommodate youth’s needs and account for changing societal structures and expectations.   While the study does not refute the youth bulge hypothesis, which contends that states where young adults constitute a large proportion of the population are expected to face an elevated risk of political violence and interstate conflict, widely used in the literature; it adds to it by proposing that while those risks exist, they can be alleviated under certain circumstances. Those circumstances include policies and strategies to be taken by governments that are relevant to youth needs and the surrounding environment. Namely, taking into consideration both agency and structure.   The study finds that, for the United Arab Emirates, the results of education and Emiratisation policies are likely to shape the shifting social contract between young Emiratis and the government, and could lead to a range of outcomes, from the promising- a population of empowered, educated, and skilled Emirati youth- to the stagnant- disappointed and apathetic youth persistent in their preference of the public sector- to the more worrisome- yet unlikely- active opposition by dissatisfied youth.   With regards to the Kingdom Saudi Arabia, the study finds that while the government is investing massively in educational and employment reforms, young Saudis need to adopt entrepreneurial values and work ethic to ensure the success of “Neo-Saudism". This in turn requires a certain level of responsiveness from the government and possibly more opportunities for youth to participate in decision making in the near future. The speed of change and the extent to which youth’s values and perspectives may clash with those of older generations is yet to be determined. The real challenge for Saudi decision makers and strategists will be in maintaining balance and stable relations between different societal groups.

Several indicators point out to the rise of far-right wing within the European bloc including polls for the upcoming European elections and the migration deal which was passed by the French parliament last December. Far right sentiments are reflected on many issues especially Migration which holds second place in the list of most pressing issues for European voters. The New European Migration Pact, which exempts Ukrainians from the new measures, reflects European leanings towards the right adding more restrictions on Migrants, refugees and Asylum seekers especially those arriving from the Middle East and Africa. The far-right leanings do not only hold significance for the European Union (EU) but they will definitely impact neighboring countries especially countries of North Africa who act as a transit for refugees and asylum seekers aiming at reaching European shores. Migrants, refugees and asylum seekers will face catastrophic humanitarian situation due the Pact’s measures such as the screening procedure which will lead to diminished safeguards and a risk of mass detention at the borders, including for children, in countries of first arrival, the Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation which regulates what happens if there is a “crisis” at the EU’s external border. European countries themselves will be put in an unenviable position due to transit countries’ levering their geopolitical positions. Using a multi-faceted criterion, the paper argues that the new pact is just a “rebranding” of ongoing European migration policies which are found to be unsuccessful. The paper uses the EU-Turkey migration deal showcasing shortcomings of European migration policies. Findings suggest that, among other losses, far-right measures taken by EU states tend to embolden transit countries vis-a-vis European states who will lose on the political as well as the economic side. Politically, they will have to make concessions in face of transit states while economically they will have to pay huge amounts of aid for the sake of borders’ externalization and keeping migrants away.

Abstract The post-World War II arrangements generated several decisions that granted the victorious countries certain powers, most notably The Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security, the Four Power Declaration, and Articles 106 and 107 of the United Nations Charter. Questions have recently been raised about the possibility of exploiting these powers to legitimize Russian intervention in Ukraine. However, given the nature and background of these articles and decisions, it turns out that they were part of the arrangements for a transitional period, followed by the transfer of these powers and tasks to the United Nations, and the subsequent new arrangements, most notably the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Russian Federation, which arranged for a new legal situation. This does not contradict the rule of inheriting international treaties as one of the principles of international law but takes into account the change in the new legal status of states. Therefore, the countries that were under the guise of the Soviet Union have become independent members in the United Nations General Assembly, and by reviewing the contents of the documented sessions of the United Nations since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, it turns out that the defenses and arguments presented by the Russian delegate to legitimize the Russian intervention in Ukraine were based on two main arguments, which were repeated in most of the Russian President’s speeches. For the Russian Federation, especially the speech of the declaration of invasion, which was based on Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which guarantees the right of states to defend themselves against threats, and Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that all peoples have the right to self-determination, meaning that any Russian ethnic minority in Ukraine has the right to determine its political status and to pursue its economic, social and cultural development.   Since Putin announced his intention to invade Ukraine militarily, numerous analyses came up that the legal arguments Russia depend on to justify the invasion, and the talk about the arrangements made after World War II that gave the powers to the victorious nations that could be exploited by the Russian side has increased recently. There is even a rumor that claims that the Russian president talked to the secretary-general of the United Nations about the article contained in the United Nations charter and these arguments depended on two articles; 106 and 107 in the United Nations charter, that gives the right to the victorious countries and nations to take any needed decision against the countries that fought against them in World War II to avoid revising the results of World War II. In these decisions, it is specially allowed to utilize military power against these countries.

According to a report by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on the state of food security and nutrition in the world in 2022, it is estimated that between 702 and 828 million people were affected by hunger in 2021, consisting of 278 million people in Africa, 425 million in Asia, and 56.5 million in Latin America and the Caribbean. The number has grown by about 150 million since the outbreak of Covid-19. The Russia-Ukraine War, involving two of the biggest producers in agriculture and staple cereals globally, is disrupting supply chains and further affecting global grain, fertilizer, and energy prices, leading to shortages and fuelling even higher food price inflation. Additionally, food security is a significant challenge in the Arab region, which is facing rising economic, socio-political, and environmental challenges impacting the food security of its growing population.   Hence, our study has examined the factors that affect food security, and our analysis allowed us to determine the top five factors affecting food security: climate change, conflict, overpopulation, inflation, and scarce resources. The study will analyze each factor separately and their effect on food security globally and in many regions, with a focus on the Arab region. Secondly, the study will analyze factors of food insecurity separately and its impact on four significant countries: Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.   We found that the factors we examined have mainly negative effects on food security, with the exception of climate change, which will positively affect some regions for the time being, and natural resources, which has some aspects that effect food security positively. Additionally, we found that the factors are interconnected since for example, conflict negatively affects food security, and it could increase food prices, as in the current Russia-Ukraine War. Likewise, the adverse impacts of climate change are expected to raise food prices further and dampen the region’s food demand translating into direct increases in malnutrition levels.   Finally, after reviewing the effects of factors on food security, we elaborated some recommendations in order to deal with the adverse effects.