Remontada?! How Will Syrian Armed Factions Redefine the Regional Landscape

On Wednesday, Nov. 27, 2024, Syrian armed factions launched a coordinated offensive targeting regime-controlled sites and militia positions in the western countryside of Aleppo, northern Syria. This operation marks the most significant joint military action since 2016, involving key groups such as “Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham” (formerly Jabhat Al-Nusra). In a video statement, the Joint Operations Room declared the initiation of the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation. The announcement emphasised that the offensive was necessitated by recent regime movements threatening civilian areas, framing the operation as a defensive imperative rather than a strategic choice. The statement underscored that this action was in direct retaliation for the Syrian regime's bombardment of north-western regions, signalling a potential escalation in the conflict dynamics of the region.

The military operation unfolds amid evolving field dynamics and shifting regional and international conditions. After years of relative stagnation on the Syrian conflict front, this resurgence of fighting holds the potential to significantly alter control structures, particularly if Al-Assad’s forces struggle to retain their positions. The confrontation carries broader implications, as an escalation between the Syrian regime and armed factions could draw major powers deeper into the conflict. Both Russia and Turkey, pursuing divergent strategic interests in Syria, risk exacerbating instability through their involvement. This breach in Aleppo marks a pivotal development in the 13-year Syrian civil war, representing the most substantial rebel offensive since 2020. The territorial gains by opposition forces constitute not just a challenge to the regime of President Bashar Al-Assad but also a significant setback for his key allies, Russia and Iran, whose regional influence and strategic investments are at stake.

The armed factions’ assault on Aleppo signifies a pivotal turning point in Syria’s complex conflict, bearing significant strategic implications that demand a thorough analysis of its underlying motives and potential consequences. This offensive coincides with escalating geopolitical tensions across the Middle East, including the Israel-Hamas war and the U.S.-backed conflict involving Hezbollah in Lebanon. Consequently, this development cannot be dismissed as a mere tactical manoeuvre; it reflects broader geopolitical realignments and shifts in regional power dynamics. Targeting Aleppo’s periphery and pushing toward its outskirts, the offensive aims to erode the regime’s hold on the city and potentially rekindle full-scale warfare in Syria. Should opposition factions successfully breach Aleppo, the resulting destabilisation could dramatically alter the conflict’s trajectory, reshaping the balance of power on the ground and contributing to wider regional volatility.

Preliminary assessments suggest that the Aleppo offensive is part of a carefully orchestrated strategy designed to capitalise on the evolving dynamics of the Syrian conflict. Several factors indicate a deliberate effort to exploit regional circumstances, notably Israel’s ongoing airstrikes on Iranian-linked targets within Syria, aimed at disrupting arms transfers to Hezbollah. Significantly, the attack coincided with critical developments: a tenuous ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah taking effect in neighbouring Lebanon and a high-profile visit by President Al-Assad to Moscow. The key motives behind this offensive can be outlined as follows:

Turkey’s shift in position, following the failure of its normalisation attempts with the Syrian regime, marks a significant strategic pivot. Ankara’s decision to support the armed factions’ offensive on Aleppo aims to bolster its influence in Syria and exert pressure on the Al-Assad regime to make political concessions. Previously, Turkey had resisted calls from opposition groups to launch the “Battle of Aleppo,” prioritising the hope of normalising relations with the Syrian government. However, following Syria’s rejection of all Turkish overtures, despite repeated statements by Turkish officials, including President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, expressing a willingness to meet with President Bashar Al-Assad, Turkey agreed to back the offensive. This shift underscores a strategic recalibration, positioning Turkey more directly against Al-Assad’s regime as diplomatic avenues falter.

Iran’s diminished role in supporting the Syrian regime, compared to the early years of the Syrian revolution, coupled with Hezbollah’s depletion of resources due to the ongoing Israeli war on southern Lebanon, has shifted the balance of power in the region. The Israeli military’s strikes on 38 military sites in Aleppo and the broader impact of the wars in Lebanon have left Hezbollah’s forces weakened, with significant losses in the battle with Israel that concluded with a ceasefire agreement just one day before the Aleppo attack. This depletion has led many analysts to speculate that Hezbollah is on the decline, with its former regional dominance waning.

The resulting power vacuum has enabled the Syrian armed factions to advance further into areas previously controlled by Iranian-backed militias, including strategic points such as Khan Tuman, Al-Eis, and Hader. The unexpected progress made by the opposition forces in Khan Tuman, in particular, contradicted earlier expectations of a protracted, bloody battle reminiscent of 2016, with heavy losses and a drawn-out war of attrition. Furthermore, Israel’s persistent targeting of Iranian militants and Revolutionary Guard officers operating within Syria, including key advisers to Al-Assad’s forces, has further destabilised the regime’s ability to rely on its external allies, creating an opportunity for the armed factions to gain ground.

Russia’s preoccupation with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine is notably significant in light of the failure of Russian forces to detect the armed factions’ attack on Aleppo. This lapse is particularly striking, considering Russia’s crucial role in providing the Syrian regime with intelligence and military support. The failure to monitor the attack could suggest a breakdown in coordination between Russian forces and the Syrian regime or a decline in the quality of air intelligence coverage. This development may signal a shift in Russia’s capacity to fully support its Syrian ally, potentially leaving the regime more vulnerable to insurgent offensives and shifting the regional power dynamics.

When Moscow intervened in the Syrian war at the close of 2015, the Russian military was at the peak of its power, and Syrian cities became a testing ground for various types of Russian-made weaponry, providing an opportunity to assess their capabilities and effectiveness. Russian forces operated with considerable strength and resources, offering extensive support to the Syrian regime over the course of five years. However, the onset of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 has significantly strained Moscow’s military capabilities. This shift has led to a situation where Russia now increasingly relies on foreign fighters, including Syrians sent from Al-Assad-controlled areas, to bolster its forces on the Ukrainian front. This arrangement reflects Russia’s need to depend on its Syrian ally as a means of reciprocating support for Al-Assad’s regime during the protracted Syrian conflict, politically and militarily.

The economic burden of Russia’s military intervention in Syria has significantly impacted the Russian economy, especially amid the harsh international sanctions imposed on Moscow. These financial pressures have forced Russia to reassess its strategy in Syria, leading to efforts to rationalise military expenditures and scale back its presence. This shift has created a strategic opening for opposition forces to capitalise on, enabling them to secure battlefield gains and alter the balance of power. At the same time, the international mood toward the Syrian conflict has evolved, with growing support for the opposition as global positions on the war shift. This evolving dynamic comes at a time when the Al-Assad regime is exhausted from years of protracted warfare, presenting a critical opportunity for effective strikes that could further destabilise the regime’s position.

Northern Syria, long regarded as the country’s gateway to the outside world, has emerged as a focal point for intricate cultural, commercial, and military exchanges. Over time, extensive regions have slipped beyond the control of the Syrian government, transforming the area into a contested arena where local and regional powers vie for influence. The involvement of foreign actors, Turkey, Russia and the U.S., has added further layers of complexity, exacerbating the already volatile situation and extending the duration of the conflict.

With the eruption of widespread protests, which swiftly escalated into an armed conflict, the city of Aleppo has become a central axis in the Syrian war. The city has borne witness to intense and protracted battles between Syrian government forces and a diverse array of armed factions, resulting in widespread devastation and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians. For all parties engaged in the conflict, securing control over Aleppo represents a critical strategic objective, not only due to its political significance but also because of its profound military symbolism.

Following Turkey’s military intervention in northern Syria at the outset of 2020, the region experienced a relative period of stability compared to previous times, which resulted in the emergence of two dominant military blocs. These blocs divided the region into two distinct areas, each governed by different systems:

• The area controlled by “Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham,” which encompasses Idlib Governorate and parts of the Aleppo and Latakia countryside. This region is characterised by a governance system with a Salafist Islamic framework.
• The area controlled by the “Syrian National Army,” which covers the northern and eastern countryside of Aleppo. This region operates under a system aligned with the Syrian armed factions, with support from Turkey.

The region has experienced rapid shifts in governance patterns driven by fluctuating field control and a complex interplay of factors. These include changing military operations, the fragile security situation, the cultural and historical composition of the population, and the volatile relationship between civilian and military actors. Additionally, the diversity of funding sources, various external interventions, and the historical accumulation of events since these areas slipped from the Syrian regime’s control have all contributed to the evolving landscape. The strategic importance of Aleppo in shaping the balance of power and influencing the trajectory of the conflict in Syria cannot be understated. The ongoing developments in Aleppo underscore the intricate dynamics at play between local, regional, and international actors and the far-reaching implications these interactions may have for Syria’s future.

The counter-aggression operation was managed under the name “Joint Operations Command.” The key participants included Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the Al-Fath Al-Mubin Operations Room, which consists of factions such as the National Liberation Front. This front includes armed factions affiliated with the Syrian National Army (SNA), established with Turkey’s support under the Ministry of Defence of the Syrian Interim Government. The Syrian National Army comprises three corps, with 26 factions under its umbrella, and the total number of fighters ranges between 70,000 and 90,000. The ethnic composition of these factions is predominantly Arab, followed by Turkmen and smaller numbers of Kurdish fighters. Prominent factions within the Syrian National Army include Ahrar al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sharqiya, Sham Legion, Hamza Division, and Sultan Murad Division, with the latter two led by Turkmen commanders, in addition to the Suleiman Shah Brigade, also known as the “Amshat,” led by Mohammad al-Jassem. Other factions with diverse regional affiliations operate across the country, from the south to the north and east. In addition to ” Jaish Al-Izza,” these factions are active in the western countryside of Aleppo, as well as in the rural areas of Hama, Latakia, and Idlib, and are led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.

The Aleppo offensive goes beyond simply aiming for military gains; it seeks to achieve a range of strategic objectives, including shifting the balance of power on the ground, weakening the Syrian regime, and forcing it to make concessions in future political negotiations. This would strengthen the position of the armed factions in any upcoming talks and provide them with stronger leverage to achieve their demands.

This offensive also contributes to revitalising international support for the opposition, reminding the international community that the Syrian crisis is still ongoing and requires a just political solution.

The military advance in Aleppo appears to be just the first phase of a broader strategic plan aimed at seizing key areas, such as Maarat al-Numan and Al-Lataminah, and then expanding toward Homs, Hama, and Deir ez-Zor. The ultimate goal is to sever the Iranian supply lines to the interior of Syria. The success of this plan would not only constrain Iran’s presence in Syria but also weaken its influence in the region. This represents a primary objective for several regional and international actors involved in the Syrian conflict. However, this could only be avoided if the Astana parties (Russia, Turkey, and Iran), along with the Syrian government and armed factions, reach an agreement to halt the fighting and return to the de-escalation lines established in dozens of meetings in the Kazakh capital over the past years.

The battlefronts in Syria have witnessed significant developments within the first 72 hours of the attack’s commencement, with the armed factions making notable advances in strategic areas, most prominently in Aleppo and its countryside. This development highlights several key points:

Weaknesses in the Syrian Intelligence System

The rapid advance of the opposition in Aleppo reveals gaps in the intelligence apparatus of the Syrian army. The armed factions managed to launch a large-scale attack without prior detection of their movements despite the Syrian army and its allies possessing an extensive network of intelligence sources. This suggests a potential weakness in coordination between intelligence units or inefficiencies in monitoring enemy movements.

Within just 24 hours of the attack’s initiation, the armed factions captured more than 25 towns and villages in the western countryside of Aleppo, including Sheikh Aqil, Bala, the 46th Regiment, and Basratun, among others. Additionally, the factions opened a new front in the eastern countryside of Idlib, capturing the towns of Dadikh and Kafr Batekh, which are close to the strategic town of Saraqib, located on the Aleppo-Damascus Highway, also known as the M5 international Motorway, which has now been cut off due to the military actions. In some northern areas, the factions came within just 10 kilometres of the city centre of Aleppo. Furthermore, the armed factions seized several Syrian army tanks, vehicles, and cars, along with large quantities of ammunition and weapons stored along one of the hottest frontline positions between the Syrian regime and the armed factions.

The Syrian armed factions’ operation toward Aleppo falls within the de-escalation zone in Idlib, which was agreed upon by Russia, Iran, and Turkey in 2019. Initially, the operation was limited, but it expanded after Syrian government forces withdrew from their positions. This attack occurred following prior offensive actions by the regime on the de-escalation zone.

Absence of Russian Presence

The failure of Russian forces to detect the attack by the armed factions on Aleppo raises fundamental questions about the extent to which Russia’s role in Syria has diminished, especially in light of the extensive support Moscow has provided to the Syrian regime, both in terms of intelligence and military assistance. This failure also highlights potential gaps in coordination between Russian forces and the Syrian regime or a decline in the efficiency of intelligence gathering and analysis methods.

Previously, the Russian Air Force, through its experience and use of hundreds of weapon types in Syria, made a transformative impact on the conflict’s trajectory. It played a crucial role in numerous battles in favour of the regime, particularly after the significant advances made by the armed factions.

Since Russia’s intervention in 2015 to protect the Assad regime, at least 7,000 civilians have been killed in Russian airstrikes under the pretext of “countering terrorism.” This includes at least 237 attacks with cluster munitions and 125 attacks using incendiary weapons.

By 2018, more than 63,000 Russian military personnel had participated in combat operations in Syria. The Russian Air Force carried out 39,000 sorties, destroying 121,466 targets that Russia describes as “terrorists.” More than 86,000 individuals were killed, excluding civilian casualties.

By mid-2023, the number of Russian military sites in Syria had reached 105, including 20 military bases and 85 military points, not counting checkpoints, barracks, or patrols. Most of these sites are concentrated in Hama, with 17 sites, followed by Al Hasakah and Latakia, each with 14 sites. These locations are heavily populated with Russian forces and Wagner Group personnel, aiming to bolster the ground forces.

This breach in Russia’s operational capabilities is mainly attributed to its preoccupation with the Russia-Ukraine war, which marked a significant shift in Russian foreign policy. Moscow has now prioritised securing its interests in its immediate neighbourhood. As a result, a significant portion of Russia’s military and intelligence resources has been redirected to the Ukrainian front, adversely affecting Russia’s role in Syria.

Additionally, the economic cost of Russia’s military intervention in Syria has placed a heavy burden on the Russian economy, particularly in light of the international sanctions imposed on Moscow. This has prompted Russia to reconsider its strategy in Syria, shifting toward more efficient expenditure and reducing its military presence.

Possession of Intelligence by Armed Factions

The organised and precise manner in which the armed factions executed their attack suggests they possessed accurate intelligence about the vulnerabilities in Syria’s defences in Aleppo. This intelligence could have been derived from leaks within the regime, the successful recruitment of field sources by the armed factions, or the employment of advanced techniques for intelligence gathering.

The collapse of the Syrian regime and its allies marks a pivotal event with profound and far-reaching consequences on multiple levels, locally, regionally, and internationally. The Aleppo attack, in particular, carries with it potential implications for the future of the conflict in Syria, including:

• Escalation of Military Confrontations: The attack could lead to a significant escalation in military clashes between regime forces and armed factions, potentially expanding the conflict into other regions.
• Complicating the Political Landscape: The attack may further complicate Syria’s already complex political situation, potentially impeding efforts toward achieving a political settlement.
• Increased Risks of Foreign Intervention: The attack could heighten the risk of foreign intervention in the Syrian conflict and escalate regional tensions.

Internal Syrian Landscape

While the Al-Assad regime controls around 70% of Syrian territory, much of this control is dependent on the support of external allies such as Russia and Iran. Therefore, the attack poses a significant threat to reigniting larger-scale conflicts within Syria, particularly in light of its allies’ preoccupation with other pressing issues. This could weaken the government’s grip on power, creating opportunities for extremist groups to regroup and expand their activities.

Syria’s internal landscape will likely witness intense competition between armed factions for power, driven by divergent ideologies (Islamist, nationalist, liberal) and conflicting regional interests of their respective sponsors. These ideological and political differences could lead to armed conflicts over control of key areas of influence, further deepening the instability in the country. Additionally, creating a new political system in Syria presents an enormous challenge, requiring internal consensus and broad regional and international support. This new system should be grounded in a new constitution that meets the aspirations of Syria’s diverse communities and ensures their active participation in state governance.

The system’s collapse would exacerbate the humanitarian crisis, likely triggering new waves of displacement both within and beyond the country. This scenario demands massive relief and humanitarian efforts to resettle refugees, deliver essential aid to displaced populations, and rebuild devastated cities. The Kurds, who exercise self-rule in northeastern Syria, would face fresh challenges in their relations with the central government and Turkey. Addressing this would necessitate crafting a framework that safeguards their rights while ensuring their active participation in shaping Syria’s future.

Al-Assad’s Allies

For Iran, the collapse of the Syrian regime would deal a significant blow to its regional ambitions, as Syria has long served as a cornerstone for Iran’s strategy to expand its influence across the Middle East. Such a development would result in the loss of critical strategic military bases, diminishing Tehran’s ability to support its allies in Lebanon and Iraq. Furthermore, Iran would suffer massive economic losses, as it would forfeit substantial investments in Syrian infrastructure and various economic sectors. These setbacks would further exacerbate Iran’s existing economic crises, potentially fuelling heightened public discontent.

As for Hezbollah, the group would face considerable challenges in the wake of the Syrian regime’s downfall. It would lose a vital logistical and military support network, thereby weakening its operational capacity in Lebanon and increasing internal pressures. Amid the rapidly shifting dynamics of the Syrian landscape, Hezbollah may find itself compelled to engage in intensified combat operations in northern Syria. This scenario becomes even more plausible following its agreement with Israel to withdraw its heavy weaponry from southern Lebanon. Consequently, northern Syria could emerge as a critical staging ground for regrouping its forces and equipment, especially as mounting pressures in southern and central Syria constrain its activities.

However, it is worth noting that Hezbollah’s recent defeat in its confrontation with the Israeli army has stripped the group of the symbolic aura it once projected, a critical factor in attracting fighters and rallying allies. This loss has significantly eroded its popular and military support base in Syria while diminishing expectations regarding its potential battlefield role.

As for Russia, the collapse of the Syrian regime would mark a severe setback for Moscow’s influence in the region, resulting in the loss of its military bases and economic investments. Such a development could compel Russia to reevaluate its strategic priorities in the Middle East, potentially scaling back its involvement in regional affairs.

The Regional Scene

Turkey has long prioritised northern Syria due to its industrial and commercial significance, as well as its hosting of Aleppo, the economic capital of Syria. This region also shares deep cultural, geographic, and demographic ties with Turkey, encompassing Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. Additionally, northern Syria holds critical importance for Turkey’s national security and geostrategic interests. These sensitivities have driven Turkey’s sustained intervention in the Syrian crisis, ranging from supporting armed groups and hosting refugees and political activities to direct military operations under the pretext of combating ISIS, safeguarding its national security, and preventing the establishment of a Kurdish state.

In this context, Turkey has entrenched its presence in the region. Beyond its military and intelligence deployments and the loyalty of armed factions, Ankara has also strengthened economic, civil, administrative, cultural, and linguistic ties with the region. It has systematically linked each part of northern Syria to a corresponding Turkish province in the south. For example, Afrin, Azaz, al-Bab, Jarabulus, Tal Abyad, and Ras al-Ayn have been connected to the Turkish provinces of Hatay, Gaziantep, Kilis, and Şanlıurfa through coordinators who effectively govern these Syrian cities. These coordinators act as the de-facto rulers of northern Syria. Meanwhile, Turkey maintains high-level coordination with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib and its surrounding areas, further consolidating its influence in the region.

Turkey appears to be pursuing a long-term strategy aimed at effectuating demographic changes in northern Syria. This involves displacing the region’s original Kurdish inhabitants and replacing them with other population groups, achieved through the forced deportation of refugees fleeing the war to Turkey or those refusing reconciliation agreements. Additionally, Ankara seeks to “Turkify” the region economically and culturally, tying it to Turkey over the long-term, even after its physical presence in the area ends.

Turkey has also exploited young Syrians by recruiting them as mercenaries to serve its interests in Azerbaijan, Libya, and Niger, with potential future deployments in Qandil. Simultaneously, Ankara is expected to bolster its influence in northern Syria, leveraging the collapse of the Syrian regime to secure its borders and strengthen loyal factions. This would exert pressure on Damascus to accept Turkey’s political vision for resolving the crisis. However, such moves will likely heighten tensions with other regional actors, particularly over the Kurdish issue.

Arab states, especially the Gulf countries, may step in to support political and economic solutions aimed at restoring stability in Syria while curbing the expansion of both Iranian and Turkish influence. Achieving this, however, would require effective Arab coordination and a unified vision for Syria’s future.

The collapse of the Syrian regime is poised to reshape Lebanon’s political landscape, marked by a decline in Hezbollah’s influence and a growing prominence of armed factions. While this may somewhat reduce sectarian polarisation, it is likely to exacerbate Lebanon’s already dire economic and political challenges.

Iran’s diminished role in Syria would inevitably translate into reduced influence in Iraq, weakening its allied militias. This shift could give Iraq’s government a crucial opportunity to assert greater independence and foster domestic security and stability.

Israel stands to benefit from the reduced influence of both Iran and Hezbollah in the region, which could ease some of its longstanding security concerns. However, Israel may also face significant challenges stemming from the instability in Syria during the transitional phase. The potential expansion of extremist groups exploiting the power vacuum in Syria could pose new security threats to Israel.

The International Community

The spread of extremist groups in Syria poses a significant security challenge for the international community. This situation necessitates strengthening international cooperation in the fight against terrorism and preventing these groups from exploiting security vacuums in Syria. In response, the U.S. and European countries will likely focus on supporting political solutions in Syria, providing reconstruction aid and bolstering stability. Achieving these goals requires effective coordination with regional stakeholders and overcoming disagreements on managing the transitional phase.

The recent developments in Aleppo stand out due to the support received by the opposition forces in Idlib, which enabled them to make notable advances. Close coordination with regional and international powers, particularly Turkey, along with logistical and military assistance from regional allies, has given these forces significant momentum. This support, including the provision of advanced weaponry such as anti-tank missiles and drones, has enhanced the opposition’s combat effectiveness and enabled them to counter the Syrian regime and its allies.

These military developments signal a new and more complex phase in the Syrian conflict that requires opposition forces to coordinate precisely with their allies while strengthening their military capabilities to achieve strategic objectives. On the other side, the Syrian regime and its allies face considerable challenges in containing the opposition’s advances and maintaining their strategic positions, particularly amid mounting military pressures and shifting power dynamics. The coming developments will ultimately determine the trajectory of the Syrian conflict and its broader impact on regional and international balances.

As military pressures mount on Iran, it continues to push the situation in Syria toward further sectarian escalation by sending military reinforcements to the front lines, such as the Iraqi militia “Kata’ib al-Imam Ali.” This strategy reflects Tehran’s determination to maintain its influence in Syria, exploiting the conflict to solidify its regional alliances.

What is unfolding in Aleppo is not merely a military battle but part of a broader geopolitical landscape reflecting strategic shifts in the Middle East. Aleppo, Syria’s second-most important city in terms of both economic and strategic significance, is undergoing profound field transformations. The increasing control of armed groups or factions from Idlib, led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, marks a development with multifaceted implications.

This transformation can be summarised in three key points:

First, this progress represents an apparent effort to weaken Iran’s influence in Syria. Tehran, which has established a strong military presence across various regions of Syria, has now become a direct target for geopolitical change. The military operations conducted by the armed opposition, which receive indirect support from regional and international actors, aim to dismantle Iran’s infrastructure and reduce its influence in Syria.

Second, media reports from Moscow indicate the involvement of experts from Ukraine and Western countries in supporting Syrian opposition groups by providing advanced technologies, such as drones. Russia perceives this move as a direct threat to its interests in Syria. While it may escalate military action in Idlib and Aleppo, it is simultaneously constrained by regional and international balance-of-power considerations.

Third, Turkey plays a central role in this scenario, with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has made the repatriation of Syrian refugees a key component of his electoral agenda, seeking to leverage control over areas in Aleppo as a means to achieve this goal. However, any escalation in these areas could lead to a new wave of displacement toward Turkey, prompting Ankara to lean toward freezing the situation through an understanding with Moscow.

The full picture will become more apparent after Aleppo. If the factions remain confined to the city limits, the outcomes will be one thing. Still, if they continue to expand, a new reality may be imposed, potentially paving the way for a long-awaited political solution in Syria.

______، “هل هجوم حلب سيطرة على مناطق جديدة أم مجرد معركة محلية محدودة؟” بي بي سي عربي، 1 ديسمبر 2024، تاريخ الاطلاع 1 ديسمبر 2024، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://www.bbc.com/arabic/articles/c98355jd5rgo

أ ف ب، “ماذا يعني التقدم السريع لفصائل مسلحة شمال سوريا؟”اندبندنت عربية، 30 نوفمبر 2024، تاريخ الاطلاع، 30 نوفمبر 2024، متاح على الرابط التالي:  https://www.independentarabia.com/node/613010/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%9F%22

رويترز، “الفصائل المسلحة تعلن التقدم نحو حماة.. ووزارة الدفاع السورية تنفي انسحاب قواتها،” الشرق الإخبارية،1 ديسمبر 2024، تاريخ الاطلاع 1 ديسمبر 2024، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://asharq.com/politics/108323/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%88-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82-%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A8-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7/

ضياء عودة، “نقطة تحوّل.. ماذا تعني سيطرة فصائل المعارضة على حلب؟”  الحرة، 30 نوفمبر 2024، تاريخ الاطلاع 1 ديسمبر 2024، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://www.alhurra.com/syria/2024/11/30/%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%91%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%9F

ضياء عودة، “هجوم حلب السورية.. سر “برود” الموقف الروسي،” الحرة، 30 نوفمبر 2024، تاريخ الاطلاع 30 نوفمبر 2024، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://www.alhurra.com/syria/2024/11/30/%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A

عبد الحليم سليمان، “من أشعل خطوط التماس بين المعارضة السورية وجيش النظام؟”، اندبندنت عربية، 28 نوفمبر 2024، تاريخ الاطلاع 29 نوفمبر  2024، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://www.independentarabia.com/node/612913/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1/%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%B4%D8%B9%D9%84-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%9F

عبير ديبة، “كيف حافظت “هيئة تحرير الشام” على نفوذها في الشمال السوري؟”، الشرق الإخبارية، 22 نوفمبر2024، تاريخ الاطلاع 30 نوفمبر 2024، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://asharq.com/politics/106803/%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%AA-%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%86%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B0%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A/

ماري-جوزيه القزي، “هجوم فصائل المعارضة السوريّة: من شن الهجوم على غرب حلب ولماذا الآن؟،” بي بي سي عربي، 29 نوفمبر 2024، تاريخ الاطلاع 1 ديسمبر 2024، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://www.bbc.com/arabic/articles/c62jp85zlnlo

Raja Abdulrahim, “Syria’s Rebels Struck When Assad’s Allies Were Weakened and Distracted,” The New York Times, December 1, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/01/world/middleeast/syria-rebels-bashar-al-assad.html

Ruth Michaelson, “Syrian Rebels Enter Aleppo Three Days Into Surprise Offensive,” The Guardian, November 30, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/29/syrian-rebels-launch-surprise-attack-on-aleppo

Sebastian Usher, “Who Are Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, HTS, the Rebels Seizing Control of Aleppo?” December 1, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce313jn453zo