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The bilateral relations between Türkiye and Iran have always been one of the most unique in the world of international relations. Although pigmented with a number of clashes over several issues, ad-hoc points of cooperation intervene to stand in the face of building an animosity between the two states. With geopolitical changes taking place recently, it deserves to study whether the “marriage of inconvenience” between the two states will continue or it will at some point be disrupted. In this analysis, both points of contention and cooperation will be discussed showing the shape the relations between the two states have been taking paving the way for understanding the persistence of the current pattern.

Points of Contention

The Kurdish question has always been a source of both contention and cooperation between Tehran and Ankara. In some occasions, cooperation emerged between the two countries such as during the American intervention in Iraq in 2003 when the two states’ views came closer. The two neighbors found a jeopardy stemming from the American annexation to Iraq as this may have led to the independence of Iraqi Kurds who appeared to be the most important partner to Americans in Iraq. However, despite sharing similar concerns regarding the possibilities of Kurdish independence, Tehran and Ankara followed contrasting policies. In 2011, contention was revived between the two states when national media in Türkiye reported that Iran had arrested the leading PKK figure Murat Karayilan which led to speculations about PKK and Iran bargains. When attacks were staged in Semdinli Hakkari, Turkish government started to blame Iran for its support to the PKK. Contentions resulted in Tehran using the PKK as a leverage against Ankara in their regional disputes. Accordingly, it is noteworthy that even when the Kurdish question opens an opportunity for mutual understanding, it is always the case that the two parties continue to find a loophole and start a clash over Kurds.

The two countries’ relations have been also strained by the Syrian conflict. Turkish support for the opposition in Syria has always been described as a threat to Iran. The Islamic regime in Iran find in the Assad regime as the only ally to Iran in the Middle East. Since the eruption of the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran’s theocratic regime and the Baathist regime in Syria have always supported each other. Assad’s free fall would constitute a problem for Iran increasing the geopolitical influence of Türkiye. It could have also left an effect on the internal politics of Iran by strengthening internal opposition and deepening internal divisions within the leadership. Turkish military intervention in Syria constitutes a concern for Iran as official media outlets in Tehran describes it as an invasion as well as calling the Syrian National Army backed by Türkiye as “Turkish-backed terrorists”. Importantly, the seizure of Tel Rifaat region along with the region of Manbij would also constitute a source of dissatisfaction for Tehran due to its proximity to the Shiite settlements of Zahra and Nubl along with Aleppo city itself. Accordingly, Tehran is taking measures of vocal objections and reinforcement efforts. The same stance had been taken by Iran against the Olive Branch operation in 2018.

Points of Cooperation

On the course of the two sides’ relations, Türkiye and Iran have found some common bases to build on a common ground. Although usually temporary, those common grounds have helped both sides to extract some benefits. Among the events which helped in their encounter, albeit by chance, was the Arab Spring. The fall of persistent regimes in the region has constituted an opportunity for both Ankara and Tehran to enter the playground in an attempt to fill-in the power vacuum and capitalize on the situation by playing the role of a regional hegemon. Although the Syrian case represented a cross-road, the election of Donald Trump in 2016 and his policy of backing the counter-revolution axis made-up of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE brought the two part-time partners on the same line once again since both of them seemed very suspicious of a new regional order was about to exist backed by American blessing. Anti-US sentiments have intensified after the 2016 coup attempt in Türkiye which was believed to be plotted with the support of Americans. Adding to this, the Qatar crisis has been one of the reasons behind their short-term close friendship. At the time of the crisis, the three states of Qatar, Türkiye and Iran constituted an axis in the face of Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Tehran and Ankara understood that they would receive a blow to their regional significance if Qatar accepted regional demands which led them to stand with Doha in the face of its neighbors’ pressures.

One of the main meeting points between the two sides which have proved its persistence over years is their trade relations. Over years, trade volume between the two states has constituted a very important factor in containing the rivalry which arises over different topics between them. Some issues have intervened which led to a decline by 73% of their bilateral trade such as Covid-19 and repetitive U.S. sanction on Tehran. However, even with sanctions being imposed on Turkish money lenders due to accusations related to alleged participation in a multi-billion-dollar scheme to avoid sanctions, both sides have expressed their desire to increase their trade volume to 39 billion-dollars on the sidelines of Erdogan’s visit to Tehran in 2022. Data published by the Turkish Institute of Statistics (TUIK) indicates that what the two leaders desired in 2022 have been already taking place on ground. Both partners have experienced a boom in their trade in 2022 surpassing 6 billion-dollars marking a 15% increase from 2021. Only through March to August, non-oil and gas imports from Iran to Türkiye has peaked to reach 49%. Numbers reveal that although at some points relations between the two states reach a grey zone, trade remains the only unbreakable bond between the two partners.

A Pattern of Continuity

The question remains whether the relations between Tehran and Ankara will remain in the “grey zone” meaning that neither a complete friendship nor rivalry will persist or a new pattern is doomed to arise given the changing political circumstances? The answer should not be a straight-forward one. In any case, it is reasonable to believe that the grey-zone is going to continue as where the relations between the two countries should be stated. It is true that the aforementioned points of cooperation have evaporated over the recent years. For instance, the geopolitical order in the region which ignited the two countries’ fears and led to their unity have been replaced with another one characterized by the end of the blockade on Qatar and warmer relations between Türkiye and its Arab counter-parts. Additionally, it is predictable that given the economic troubles the Turkish economy is struggling with, the Turkish president would seek a policy that witnesses more cooperation with the rich Gulf states for support. Something which have been already taking place for the last couple of years. Despite the fact that it seems that areas of understanding between the Turks and Persians are fading away, other factors ensure that the current statuesque will presume. First of all, Iran understands that an aggressive attitude will provoke a negative reaction from Türkiye turning its face towards Israel and the Gulf. In the same vein, Türkiye understands that instability inside the neighboring Iran would not put Turkish borders in a good situation. Most importantly, their trade relations reveal a common interest in keeping an “open door”. Finally, it is probably a fact that there is no long-term goal nor a common enemy for the two states to keep their friendship but it is also true that ad-hoc common interests usually arise breaking the cycle of rivalries.

References

Qaed, Anas Al. “Pursuing a Precarious Peace: Examining the Turkey-Iran Relationship.” Gulf International Forum, July 19, 2022. https://gulfif.org/pursuing-a-precarious-peace-examining-the-turkey-iran-relationship/

This aerial view shows Turkish-backed Syrian rebel fighters in the border town of Azaz in the rebel-held northern part of the Aleppo province heading toward the Kurdish-controlled town of Tel Rifaat on June 9, 2022. – BAKR ALKASEM/AFP via Getty Images, 2023 Sofiane ALSAAR | AFP | Apr 25, 2023 Peter MURPHY | AFP | Apr 25, and 2023 Mahmut BOZARSLAN | AFP | Apr 25. “Iran, Turkey Brace for Face-off in Syria.” Al, 2022. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/06/iran-turkey-brace-face-syria

Cengiz, Mehmet Emin. “The Future of the Iranian-Turkish Relationship: A Contained Geopolitical Rivalry or a Possible Escalation between Ankara and Tehran?” Al Sharq Strategic Research, September 30, 2022. https://research.sharqforum.org/2022/09/20/iranian-turkish-relationship/#_edn12

Tüi̇k Kurumsal, 2022. https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Dis-Ticaret-Istatistikleri-Agustos-2022-45543

Larrabee, Stephen, and Alireza Nader. “Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East.” NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 2013. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR258/RAND_RR258.pdf

Agency, Tasnim. “Turkey-Iran See $6 Billion Trade in 2022 – Economy News – Tasnim News Agency.” Tasnim News Agency. Tasnim News Agency, February 3, 2023. https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2023/02/03/2847726/turkey-iran-see-6-billion-trade-in-2022

Turak, Natasha. “Erdogan’s Celebrity Welcome in the UAE Affirms a Sea-Change in Relations, Lifeline for Turkey’s Economy.” CNBC. CNBC, February 27, 2022. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/15/erdogans-uae-visit-affirms-shift-in-relations-help-for-turkeys-economy.html

A Year of War on Gaza: Who Loses and Who Gains?

The Israel-Hamas War has now entered its second year following the unexpected assault by Palestinian factions on Israel on October 7, 2023. This sudden attack disrupted Israel’s long-held sense of security, undermining public confidence in both the Israeli military and its intelligence apparatus. In response to the incursion, the Israeli military launched a devastating offensive on Gaza, resulting in over 41,500 fatalities and leaving 96,000 others wounded Moreover, a punitive blockade has severely cut off essential supplies of food, energy, water, and medicine, crippling Gaza’s already fragile healthcare system. The blockade, coupled with ongoing military strikes, has devastated key infrastructure, housing, the economy, agricultural lands, and fishing fleets. This has pushed nearly half a million people into a state of food insecurity. Israel has consistently forced Gaza’s residents to relocate into increasingly confined areas, with the number of displaced individuals now reaching nearly 1.9 million. The widespread devastation has led the United Nations to issue repeated warnings, cautioning that Israel’s actions are rendering Gaza uninhabitable. After a year of war, Israel has failed to achieve its primary objectives. Hamas remains intact, and the prisoners held by its factions have not been released. Instead, the war has widened, with violence escalating beyond Gaza and into the West Bank, while tensions between Israel and Iran, along with its regional proxies, have intensified. This escalation has pushed the Middle East to the brink of a broader confrontation, potentially setting the stage for a full-scale war between Israel, Iran, and its respective proxies. As hopes for a ceasefire and prisoner exchange dwindle, pressing questions now emerge: Who stands to lose and who will benefit from this protracted war? When and how will Israel’s war conclude, and what will be left in its wake? This analysis highlights the gains and losses of the most important parties to the conflict as follows:

Mostafa Ahmed

Axis of Resistance Humanitarian Disaster ···

Programmes

Political Studies

28 Jul 2024

Unpacking the Majdal Shams Attack

The Israel-Hamas War has fundamentally altered the dynamics of engagement between Israel and Hezbollah. Before October 7 the two adversaries adhered to a set of engagement rules established after their 2006 conflicts, which restricted their military actions to specific areas like the Shebaa Farms, avoiding deeper incursions into each other's territory. However, over the past nine months, these rules have eroded, leading to an escalation that, while intense, has not yet escalated into full-scale war. In October 2023, Hezbollah escalated its involvement by launching rockets into Israeli-occupied territories. This marked a significant shift, with both parties engaging in psychological warfare, openly sharing or hinting at intelligence about each other. Hezbollah’s actions soon expanded to include strikes deeper into Israeli territory. In response, Israel targeted Hezbollah military installations near the Israeli-Lebanese border. It conducted a series of targeted assassinations of leaders within the elite Radwan Division, which oversees operations near the border. Israel’s retaliatory measures have since broadened to encompass a wider area of southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, indicating a significant escalation in the conflict dynamics. The conflict further escalated to encompass the village of Majdal Shams, a Druze village in the Golan Heights. The Israeli military spokesperson reported that a rocket targeting the village was an Iranian-made Falaq-1, launched from the area north of Shebaa in southern Lebanon, with Hezbollah allegedly responsible for the attack. According to the Israeli account and preliminary investigations, the missile was indeed launched from Lebanese territory, specifically the Shebaa Farms. However, it was not intended to strike Majdal Shams; an Israeli missile interception redirected it, causing it to land in the village.

Mostafa Ahmed

Attack Axis of Resistance ···

The Resurgence of Assassination as A Political Tool

Programmes

Political Studies

22 Jul 2024

The Resurgence of Assassination as A Political Tool

Political assassinations have been a constant occurrence in world politics. Assassination as a political tool is, however, not exclusive to states nor state leaders; anyone who has fired a gun against a political figure claims the title of an assassin. Additionally, involvement in politics in any capacity can leave you vulnerable to such acts of retaliation. While gunmen and fanatics still impose a threat, states themselves are considered to be leading the pack. During the Cold War, the business of assassination was largely monopolized by superpowers. The United States and the Soviet Union directed operations targeting high-profile figures such as Cuba’s Fidel Castro, Chile’s Salvador Allende, and Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz Tito. Some "hits" gained more fame than others such as the assassination of dissident Bolshevik leader Leon Trotsky in Mexico City using an ice pick by Stalin’s secret police. Russia and the United States, once the dominant global poles, continue to hold on to their old love for eliminating those they deem adversaries. The Kremlin has a long tradition, stretching back a century, of eliminating political dissidents both at home and abroad to send chilling messages to other opponents. In February 2024, a Russian pilot who had defected to Ukraine was assassinated in Spain. He was shot six times and then run over by a car, with Russian-made bullet casings left at the scene—a crude warning to others. Recently, U.S. intelligence uncovered a Russian plot to assassinate the chief executive of a powerful German arms manufacturer producing artillery shells and military vehicles for Ukraine. The United States has also continued its practice of carrying out high-profile assassinations with its most recent target being Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in Baghdad in a strike that showed little regard for international law. States vary in their levels of expertise in assassination, with Israel often considered the maestro of this practice. Assassination has been a foundational principle of the Israeli state. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has targeted Nazi leaders, Palestinians, Arabs, and scientists serving its enemies, such as German scientists working on the then Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s advanced weapons program. Currently, the pool of targets has expanded, with Iranians becoming significant targets of Israeli operations. One of the latest operations against Iranians involved the assassination of Hassan Sayyad Khodaei. Known only to intelligence personnel as a key figure at the tactical level in the Quds Force, Khodaei's primary focus was on attempting (mostly unsuccessfully) to attack Jewish and Israeli targets abroad. Nevertheless, the pool of nations engaged in assassination attempts appears to be expanding with new entrants. A notable incident occurred in Canada last June, where Sikh separatist Hardeep Singh Nijjar was shot 34 times. Additionally, in January of the same year, British Sikhs were warned by police about increased risks to their lives. This incident marks India’s grand entrance into the stage of those countries using assassination as a tool for advancing both international and domestic agendas. It highlights how political assassinations have resurfaced as a widespread tactic, no longer monopolized by a handful of states.

Habiba Diaaeldin

Cold War Political Assassinations

Iran’s Presidential Election: Intense Competition and High Stakes

Programmes

Political Studies

27 Jun 2024

Iran’s Presidential Election: Intense Competition and High Stakes

Iranians are voting in a snap presidential election on June 28, following the sudden death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May. This situation is not unprecedented for the Iranian regime, which has faced similar scenarios. In 1981, Iran’s first president following the Islamic Revolution Abolhassan Banisadr, was removed from office by the Islamic Consultative Assembly for political incompetence. Later that year, his successor, President Mohammad-Ali Rajai, was killed in a suitcase bombing. Thus, the current political and constitutional vacuum is not new to Iran. This pattern of instability has occurred twice before during significant periods of political upheaval. Ebrahim Raisi was one of the few figures who enjoyed the trust of the security establishment and the regime's cleric guards. He was expected to oversee the rise of a new supreme leader after the death of Ali Khamenei or perhaps become the supreme leader himself. Therefore, Raisi's death poses a significant challenge to the mullahs' regime, especially given the internal and external challenges that Iran has faced recently. On the other hand, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei paved the way for the presidential elections by selecting only six candidates who passed the examination conducted by the Guardian Council. This council, comprising 12 clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader, nominated by the judiciary chief, and approved by parliament, filtered the candidates based on loose criteria that it interprets and explains. Out of 80 candidates who applied for the position, only these six were allowed to run, with the Guardian Council having the final say in choosing or excluding candidates. For instance, while the Iranian Constitution does not explicitly bar women from running for president, the Guardian Council effectively prevents them from doing so. Despite four women registering candidacies in the current and past 13 presidential elections, none have been approved. Article 115 of Iran’s Constitution requires the president to be “a politician and cleric of Iranian origin, an Iranian citizen, a director and a wise man, who enjoys a good reputation, honesty, and piety, and believes in the foundations of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the official religion of the country.” Additionally, criteria related to administrative capabilities are considered. Beyond these criteria, it is widely believed that Khamenei favours a loyal and conservative president who aligns with his views and adheres to the principles of the regime, including obedience to the Supreme Leader. Therefore, this analysis aims to clarify the significance of these elections, the management process, and the priorities that voters and the regime seek in the next president.

Mostafa Ahmed

Conservatives Elections ···

The Fallout of Escalating Iranian-Israeli Tensions

Programmes

Economics and Energy

17 Apr 2024

The Fallout of Escalating Iranian-Israeli Tensions

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard's Air Force made a historic move by launching a direct assault on Israel in an operation dubbed "The True Promise," marking the first instance of such an attack originating from Iranian territory. Late on Saturday, April 13, 2024, Israeli cities were subjected to a relentless barrage of drones and ballistic missiles, signalling a significant escalation in tensions between the two nations. This offensive action follows Iran's earlier pledge to retaliate against Israel for its targeting of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, an incident that resulted in the deaths of seven Revolutionary Guard members, including two high-ranking leaders, on April 1. This calculated escalation underscores Iran's unwavering commitment to defending its sovereignty and national interests while bolstering regional security. The global spotlight now shifts to the scale, sophistication, and broader implications of Iran's strike against Israel. The Iranian assault on Israeli soil marks a pivotal moment in the ongoing conflict between the two adversaries, thrusting their hostilities from the shadows into the open arena of direct confrontation. Against this backdrop, the Israeli response hinges on several key factors. Firstly, the extent to which Iranian proxies, such as the Houthis and Hezbollah, may actively participate in the conflict will influence Israel's strategic calculus. Secondly, the response will be shaped by the presence or absence of casualties among Israeli forces, as well as the effectiveness of its defence systems, bolstered by support from the United States, in mitigating potential damage. Lastly, how Israel opts to retaliate will be of paramount importance in determining the trajectory of the conflict. Consequently, this analysis aims to elucidate the attack's ramifications and its economic repercussions on the parties involved in the conflict.

Dr. Mohamed Shadi, Mostafa Ahmed

Drones Geopolitical Tensions ···

The Vicious Cycle of Violence: Next Steps Post-Jordan Attack

Programmes

Early Warning

30 Jan 2024

The Vicious Cycle of Violence: Next Steps Post-Jordan Attack

On Jan. 28, 2024, a significant drone strike occurred at an American military outpost situated along the Jordanian-Syrian border. The targeted attack led to the death of three American troops, with 34 additional personnel sustaining injuries, as reported in the latest statement released on Jan. 30, 2024. This event holds profound implications and is poised to instigate repercussions that warrant careful analysis and monitoring. Notably, it marks the first instance of American service members being killed by hostile fire in the Middle East since the commencement of the Israel-Hamas War. The attack's location and timing carry additional connotations, underscoring the need to anticipate and evaluate the potential developments that may occur. Moreover, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) claimed responsibility for the attack in a statement, explicitly stating, “We targeted four enemy bases, including three situated in Syria: Al-Shaddadi base, Al-Rukban base, and Al-Tanf base (located near the Syrian-Jordanian border). The fourth targeted base is within the occupied Palestinian territories, identified as the Zevulun Naval Facility.”

Dr. Mohamed Shadi, Mostafa Ahmed

Islamic Resistance Militias ···

Programmes

Early Warning

30 Nov 2023

An Open Letter to COP28

Dear leaders, negotiators, and decision makers, This year, "Unite-Act-Deliver" is the slogan of COP28, a pivotal event in the international endeavour to combat climate change. The increasing number of climate disasters in 2023, wherein severe weather phenomena have wreaked devastation on a global scale, shows the urgency of the need to act. The United States, Hong Kong, Greece, Libya, Turkey, Bulgaria, Spain, Taiwan, Pakistan and China were all affected by hurricanes, storms, droughts, and flooding. The floods that struck Libya and Pakistan were particularly devastating, resulting in substantial destruction of infrastructure and loss of life, and increasing sea levels and heat surges that have been felt globally have also occurred. Furthermore, the adverse effects of climate change on food and water security on a global scale have impeded progress towards attaining the Sustainable Development Goals. In particular, food systems are accountable for one-third of worldwide green gas emissions and have slowed agricultural productivity for the past five years which entails the transformation of food systems to achieve net-zero emissions.

Pacinte Abdel-Fattah, Sandra Ramzy

COP28 Diplomacy ···

Great Power Competition and Rebalancing Acts in the Middle East

Programmes

Political Studies

31 May 2023

Great Power Competition and Rebalancing Acts in the Middle East

Many analysts argue that Washington is losing its position as the only global hegemon with the rise of other Great Powers in the international arena. The relative demise of the American superpower paves the way for the end of an exceptional era of a Uni-Polar system and the rise of either a Bi-Polar or a Multi-Polar one. Arguments usually revolve around the rise of Russia and China as the main rivals to the United States. However, in this analysis, we argue that the Russian side is better to avoid being considered for such a competition for being involved in a hectic war which requires a sweeping victory for Moscow to compensate for heavy economic losses. China, on the other hand, is gaining momentum on the diplomatic and, to a lesser extent, the security front as new territories for Beijing ever to set foot on. Nevertheless, it is also the case that Washington is still maintaining its supremacy in major arms sales. The Middle East proved to be of paramount importance in the competition among great powers. With Beijing, Washington, and even Moscow trying to gain some influence, countries of the region have been shifting their foreign policies to be more independent to maximise benefits from the newly established world order. Accordingly, they are playing the rebalancing game which stipulates balancing powers mainly between the United States and China.

Habiba Diaaeldin

MENA Diplomacy New World Order

Nationalism: The Last Card in Erdogan’s Hands

Programmes

Political Studies

2 May 2023

Nationalism: The Last Card in Erdogan’s Hands

With the date of Turkish elections coming soon, Turkish president and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) are facing one of the most serious challenges since the year they came to power. Namely, inflation exceeded 80% in September 2022 and Turkish Lira plummeted in the face of American Dollar. These economic hardships are leading the prospects of a political change to peak. According to polls, Erdogan is in real trouble with the AKP receiving barely 29.5% of votes. Accordingly, Erdogan and his allies resorted to the Nationalist rhetoric knowing that it is an important card when it comes to attracting Turkish citizens’ votes. Turkish Nationalism is believed to be nurtured by Kurdish uprisings and the belief in the “revival” of the Ottoman empire. Next May, general elections are to be held in the middle of the aforementioned atmosphere which threatens Erdogan's legacy. Using the same nationalist tactic as he used in 2018, will the Turkish President succeed again or it is a burned card not useful anymore?

Habiba Diaaeldin

Nationalism NATO ···

El-Sisi’s Visit to Ankara: A Key Diplomatic Move During Unrest

Programmes

Political Studies

5 Sep 2024

El-Sisi’s Visit to Ankara: A Key Diplomatic Move During Unrest

In a move with significant political and economic implications, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi embarked on an official visit to Ankara Sept. 4, 2024. This highly anticipated visit comes months after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to Egypt earlier this year and his invitation to President El-Sisi to Ankara. The current visit, considered a turning point in Egyptian-Turkish relations, aims to strengthen bilateral cooperation and open new avenues for coordination on regional and international issues. After a decade of tension and estrangement in the relations between Egypt and Turkey. The Egyptian President's visit to Turkey is of special importance, as it is the culmination of a long phase of discussions aimed at restoring relations between Egypt and Turkey to their normal course. The rounds of talks and meetings concluded with Erdogan's visit to Cairo last February, which witnessed the announcement of the revival of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council for relations between the two countries in its new form, where both leaders co-chair the first meeting of the Council. The meeting also involved a comprehensive review of the Egyptian-Turkish bilateral relations and discussions on potential steps to further enhance the Egyptian-Turkish cooperation. This analysis highlights the motivations of this visit and its implications on regional and Turkish politics.

Mostafa Ahmed, Ahmed Abouyoussef

African Union Bilateral Trade ···

The Power of the Word: How the UAE Redefined International Mediation?

Programmes

Political Studies

21 Jul 2024

The Power of the Word: How the UAE Redefined International Mediation?

The 21st century has witnessed a resurgence of mediation as a pivotal tool for resolving international disputes. This resurgence is driven by the complexities of contemporary conflicts and the expansion of threats beyond traditional regional conflicts, civil wars, and political crises. The scope of security threats now includes issues such as climate change, cybersecurity, and transnational organised crime. Several countries have played significant roles in mediation, leveraging their diplomatic acumen, political influence, and economic resources to facilitate dialogue and prevent escalation. Norway has consistently demonstrated its commitment to peacebuilding through active participation in resolving conflicts among the most prominent mediators. From Sri Lanka to Colombia and the facilitation of the Oslo Accords, Norway has embodied its ability to promote dialogue between seemingly irreconcilable adversaries. Known for its multilateral approach and emphasis on consensus building, Finland initiated the Group of Friends of Mediation in September 2010, significantly contributing to peace processes in the Horn of Africa. Similarly, Switzerland, with its long-standing tradition of neutrality, has provided a safe and neutral venue for countless peace talks and negotiations, fostering an environment conducive to compromise and resolution. Amid the resurgence of mediation in international diplomacy, the last decade has witnessed the emergence of non-Western actors in this field. At the forefront is the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has become an essential player in the Middle East and beyond. Since its founding, the UAE has combined traditional Arab values with modern diplomatic practices to address the cultural complexities of regional conflicts, adopting a policy of promoting peace, security, and stability both regionally and globally. The UAE’s commitment to mediation is evident in its numerous initiatives aimed at calming conflicts and crises, including active mediation in the ongoing conflict in Yemen, facilitating dialogue and humanitarian aid, playing a crucial role in reconciliation efforts between India and Pakistan; its pivotal role in the historic 2018 peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, marking a significant achievement in regional stability; facilitating prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine, showcasing the UAE's diplomatic reach; mediation efforts between Russia and the United States (U.S.), further highlighting the UAE's influence; and hosting the COP28 Climate Conference in Dubai, underscoring the UAE's active participation in global diplomacy. However, the path to mediation is fraught with challenges. The inherent complexities of many regional conflicts, the conflicting interests of the parties involved, and the need to balance mediation efforts with national interests can hinder the achievement of sustainable solutions. Additionally, maintaining neutrality in polarised situations, limited influence over non-state actors, and potential capacity constraints are challenges that the UAE must overcome to ensure the continued success of its mediation efforts. Hence, the UAE’s role as a rising international mediator, focusing on the factors that enabled its rise, its mediation strategies, and the impact of its efforts on regional and global conflicts will be examined.

Mostafa Ahmed

Chivalrous knight Consensus ···

Between Grain and AK-47s: Russian Influence in Africa

Programmes

Political Studies

11 Apr 2023

Between Grain and AK-47s: Russian Influence in Africa

The Russian presence in Africa has recently increased after a decline of nearly three decades since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the nineties of the last century. Russian-African relations are part of Russia's new strategy to enhance its international influence. This strategy conforms to Russia's situation in international affairs, including its support for countries that contradict Western policies. Moscow has focused its influence on the West African region, taking advantage of Western policy mistakes, the mounting anti-European sentiment, and the long-standing failure of international and domestic actors to address the root causes of the regional instability. The first Russian-African summit in Sochi in October 2019 concluded contracts with more than 30 African countries for the supply of weapons and military equipment. It thus opened the door for state-backed companies to invest heavily in the security and technology sectors and industries that extract natural resources such as oil, gas, gold and other minerals. On the other hand, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict did not impede this rapprochement but rather contributed to developing the partnership between the two parties to take the form of a strategic alliance. This was apparent in the speeches and statements of President Vladimir Putin, the most prominent of which was the speech he delivered at the International Parliament Conference "Russia - Africa in a Multipolar World", which was held in Moscow in March of this year on the sidelines of Saint Petersburg preparations for the second coming Russian – African summit to be held in July 2023. Putin reiterated that cooperation between Moscow and African countries was and will always be one of the top fixed priorities of Russia's foreign policy, declaring Russia's fulfilment of all its obligations, including supply of food, fertilisers, fuel and other essential products to the countries of the continent, which helps ensure food and energy security. In light of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict, this analysis aims to shed more light on the motivations and characteristics of the Russian strategy in Africa. It also seeks to highlight the challenges to Russian influence expansion as well as the prospects for Russian-African relations in the future.

Mostafa Ahmed

Diplomacy Future ···

Sports Diplomacy: How Do Sports Events Enhance the Reputation of Countries?

Programmes

Political Studies

29 Mar 2023

Sports Diplomacy: How Do Sports Events Enhance the Reputation of Countries?

The FIFA World Cup in 2022 in Qatar garnered more attention from the international community due to Qatar's ability to change perceptions of it as a nation capable of hosting the biggest sporting events. Many countries have recently sought to host international sports events in an effort to enhance their posture diplomatically, improve their reputation as well as shore up their position within the international community. To that end, “Sports Diplomacy” has been used to achieve understanding and peace among nations and promote the countries’ political and ideological goals. On the other hand, countries exploited sports as an approach aiming at asserting the superiority and strength of the state; for instance, the 1936 Olympic Games were held in Germany, and the 1934 FIFA World Cup was held in Mussolini’s Italy. In other cases, sports played a more constructive role in the 1990s, representing an opportunity for South Africa to surpass the apartheid era and look forward to a better future. For China, sports have played a role in introducing an open policy and a more influential economy. A state’s reputation is one of the key factors affecting its international relations, as it reflects its global image, influencing its recognition and interaction with other countries. With sports diplomacy, states could carry out several interests, such as boosting diplomatic ties with other states, raising the degree of understanding and cooperation among people and governments, and improving the state's public image globally. In other words, sports diplomacy is an effective tool for attaining diplomatic goals and promoting the state’s reputation worldwide. This analysis seeks to shed more light on the link between sports diplomacy and the state’s reputation and how the state’s stance in the international community is enhanced by sports diplomacy.

Mostafa Ahmed

Diplomacy Reputation ···

Have Netanyahu’s Judicial Reforms Opened an Existential Can of Worms?

Programmes

Early Warning

1 Mar 2023

Have Netanyahu’s Judicial Reforms Opened an Existential Can of Worms?

Israel’s proclaimed status as the only democracy in the Middle East is coming into question as enraged Israelis take to the streets to protest the governments’ most recent proposals. Netanyahu’s controversial right-wing government’s attempt to overhaul the judiciary has intensified polarization and widened the longstanding gaps between the right and left as well as the secular and the religious segments of society. The proposed law, which would allow the government to override court decisions by a simple majority and make its own judicial appointments, has already passed votes in a session of the Knesset Law and Constitution Committee to go to its first reading at the Knesset on February 20th, supposedly leaving time for the sides to attempt a negotiation process. However, as trust in political parties and the formal democratic process has declined, protesting until the decision is reversed appears to be the left’s only option as protests continue for the seventh week. Still, whether the outcome is a reversed decision or a prolonged negotiation process, the current situation has arguably been a catalyst for a societal transformation that may have been long overdue for Israelis. For years, many have been asking “what happened to the Israeli left?” but the process currently unfolding may have greater implications. The question now is, how significant is this transformation, to what extent can it penetrate and reshape some of the most deeply rooted elements of Israeli political culture and what impact could this potentially have on the conflict with Palestine?

Sandra Ramzy

Diplomacy Judicial Reform ···

RoboCop: AI’s Impact on the Future of Police

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Early Warning

7 Feb 2023

RoboCop: AI’s Impact on the Future of Police

On November 30th, the San Diego police department received approval from supervisors to deploy robots with lethal capabilities in emergency situations, making it the second California city to publicly discuss the use of remote lethal force after Oakland in October 2022. The decision generated immediate backlash which pushed supervisors to put the program on hold following a vote on December 6th. San Diego and Oakland may have halted the use of “killer robots” for now, but they have been used previously in the United States after Dallas police used a robot to kill a mass shooter in 2016. The mass shooter had already killed five police officers and injured dozens more. The robot was equipped with an explosive, then moved to a wall behind the shooter, then the bombs exploded killing the mass shooter and slightly damaging the robots arm, marking the first usage of a “killer robot” by U.S. law enforcement. Robots in domestic law enforcement are not unusual in U.S. police departments, and many have operated robots for close to a decade but they have been used to inspect suspicious packages or deliver items during hostage negotiations without risking police officers and until 2016 not for lethal purposes.

Ahmed El-Saeid

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Türkiye and Iran: A Marriage of Inconvenience

Points of Contention

Points of Cooperation

A Pattern of Continuity

References

Comments

Write a comment

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