A Troubled Chain of Command: Politics and the IDF

The appointment of Major General Eyal Zamir to the helm of the Israeli Army, will take office on March 6, transcends a routine leadership transition. It portends a potential strategic recalibration in Israeli military thinking, responding to evolving threats and perceived doctrinal vulnerabilities. Lauded across Israel's political spectrum as the right leader for these turbulent times, Zamir inherits a complex and precarious landscape. He is tasked with revitalizing an army perceived as "faltering," navigating a potentially obstructive political environment, and addressing a volatile region simmering with unresolved conflicts. Adding to the weight on his shoulders is the historical baggage he carries in the eyes of Palestinians, for whom his name evokes memories of harsh measures during past uprisings and operations. This analysis delves into the implications of Zamir's appointment, the delicate dance between political leadership and military autonomy in Israel, the anticipated doctrinal shifts under his command, and the spectre of looming confrontations on multiple fronts.

The near-unanimous endorsement of Eyal Zamir as Chief of Staff across Israel’s politically fractured landscape is a striking phenomenon. In a nation often characterized by deep divisions, this consensus underscores the perceived severity of the security challenges facing Israel and the widespread belief in Zamir’s capabilities. His primary qualification stems from his extensive prior involvement in formulating Israeli army doctrine. This is not simply a career military appointment, but a deliberate signal pointing towards a leader equipped to actively mould and refine the IDF’s strategic approach, moving beyond mere operational management. Zamir’s doctrinal expertise suggests a recognition within the Israeli establishment that the country needs to transition from reactive defence to proactive strategic adaptation in the face of future threats. This echoes broader discussions within military theory about the need for doctrinal agility in rapidly changing security environments.

Beyond his professional qualifications, the reported insistence of Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich on Zamir’s appointment is particularly revealing. This influence suggests that Zamir’s candidacy aligns with a specific strategic vision favoured by certain political factions, particularly those advocating for a more assertive and less compromising stance on national security issues. Smotrich’s preference underlines the intricate interplay between military leadership and political agendas in Israel, where the selection of a Chief of Staff can become a focal point for broader ideological and strategic debates. It implies a political desire for a leader who is likely to endorse or implement a more robust, potentially uncompromising approach to national security – one that prioritizes decisive military action over diplomatic solutions in certain scenarios.

However, while Zamir’s credentials resonate positively within Israel, his past actions cast a long shadow in the eyes of Palestinians. especially the bloody chapters against them through the suppression of the two Palestinian intifadas and his role in southern Lebanon. This Palestinian perspective is not merely anecdotal; it represents a deep-seated and historically grounded distrust.

To Palestinians, Zamir’s appointment, while welcomed within Israel as a source of strength and stability, is likely perceived as a foreboding sign of further hardening Israeli policies and a potential escalation of conflict. His historical associations fuel existing mistrust and reinforce the Palestinian narrative of a military leader predisposed to forceful measures against Palestinian resistance. This pre-existing animosity could, in turn, further inflame tensions and significantly complicate any future attempts at de-escalation, peace negotiations, or political resolution within the Israeli-Palestinian context.

This tension is not unprecedented; instances of friction between Israeli political and military echelons have surfaced throughout Israel’s history, often stemming from differing perspectives on strategic priorities, operational autonomy, and the very role of the military in Israeli society. The current mention of potential undermining suggests a heightened level of distrust or conflicting agendas between the political leadership, particularly under Prime Minister Netanyahu, and the military command under Zamir. This could originate from differing strategic visions – for instance, regarding the approach to Gaza or Iran – political interference in operational decision-making, or a broader political strategy aimed at consolidating control over key state institutions, including the military.

Such a strained relationship can be profoundly detrimental to the IDF’s operational effectiveness and strategic coherence. Military operations, by their nature, demand clear lines of command, a foundation of mutual trust between political and military leaders, and the necessary autonomy for military professionals to make timely operational decisions based on strategic assessments, free from undue political pressure or micromanagement. If Zamir’s authority is genuinely undermined, the consequences could be severe. These may include confusion in the chain of command, hesitancy and delays in critical decision-making processes, and the distortion of military doctrine, potentially shaping it more by political expediency and short-term goals rather than by sound, long-term strategic principles. Furthermore, the earlier indication that Smotrich’s demand may have been instrumental in Zamir’s appointment amplifies concerns about the potential for partisan political influence to penetrate even the most senior levels of military leadership selection, potentially compromising the professional ethos and apolitical nature of the IDF.

The ideal civil-military relationship, as described in democratic theory and best practices, is predicated on mutual respect and a clear, well-defined division of labour. Political leaders are entrusted with setting overarching strategic goals, defining national security objectives, and allocating resources, while military leaders assume responsibility for translating these broad goals into effective military strategies, operational plans, and tactical execution. However, in highly charged and intensely politicized environments such as Israel, particularly within the context of enduring security threats and deep societal divisions, this delicate balance can become extraordinarily fragile and susceptible to disruption. Zamir’s ultimate success will hinge not solely on his undeniable military capabilities but equally on his political acumen – his capacity to navigate these complex political currents, to strategically assert the IDF’s professional independence and integrity, and cultivate and maintain a functional, productive working relationship with the political leadership, even if that leadership exhibits tendencies to exert undue influence or encroach upon military autonomy.

A central and highly significant insight is the anticipation of a discernible doctrinal shift within the Israeli army under Zamir’s command. The “small and wise” approach, characterized by an emphasis on precision strikes, technological superiority, and limited, targeted ground incursions – a doctrine likely forged in the context of asymmetric warfare against non-state actors over the past decade – is now being fundamentally challenged by a growing consensus within the Israeli military establishment. This emerging conviction is that the IDF “must return to being large and classic, relying on ground invasion, tanks and armoured vehicles.” This signals a decisive move away from counter-terrorism-focused strategies toward a more conventional military posture, reminiscent of historical IDF doctrines. This strategic reorientation is explicitly attributed to critical lessons gleaned from recent conflicts, particularly the wars in Gaza and Lebanon, which are perceived to have revealed severe weaknesses in field warfare.

This doctrinal pivot represents a potentially seismic strategic reorientation for the IDF. It implicitly acknowledges a growing recognition that asymmetric warfare capabilities, while undeniably effective in specific, limited contexts, may be inherently insufficient to comprehensively address the full spectrum of Israel’s multifaceted security challenges. The perceived vulnerabilities in field warfare, acutely exposed in the Gaza and Lebanon conflicts, likely underscore the difficulties encountered in achieving decisive military victories against deeply entrenched and adaptable adversaries like Hamas and Hezbollah, particularly in complex, densely populated urban environments. These conflicts demonstrated limitations in neutralizing enemy infrastructure, securing territory for extended periods, and transitioning from tactical gains to lasting strategic outcomes using primarily asymmetric tactics. The renewed emphasis on ground invasion, tanks, and armoured vehicles, therefore, signals a deliberate return to a more robust, conventionally oriented military posture, explicitly designed to project overwhelming power, achieve decisive battlefield victories through manoeuvre and firepower, and potentially occupy and exert control over contested territories, if deemed necessary.

This fundamental doctrinal shift, if implemented comprehensively, will necessitate profound transformations across the IDF’s entire organizational structure, training methodologies, and long-term procurement priorities. It would predictably require a significant reinvestment in conventional military capabilities, including heavy armour, artillery, and mechanized infantry, potentially requiring a reallocation of resources away from areas previously prioritized, such as asymmetric warfare units, specialized counter-terrorism forces, and intelligence-gathering operations tailored for low-intensity conflicts. Military training regimes would need to be fundamentally adjusted to re-emphasize combined arms operations, large-scale manoeuvre warfare tactics, and sustained, high-intensity ground combat scenarios – skills that may have atrophied somewhat during the IDF’s focus on asymmetric engagements over the past decades. Procurement decisions would likely shift, prioritizing the acquisition of modern main battle tanks, advanced armoured personnel carriers, sophisticated artillery systems, and other heavy weaponry systems traditionally associated with conventional, force-on-force warfare – a significant departure from procurement trends focused on technologies suited for counter-insurgency and precision strike capabilities.

However, this strategic return to a “classic” army and a doctrine of ground dominance is not without inherent risks and potential drawbacks. Conventional warfare, especially large-scale ground operations, can be extraordinarily costly, not only in financial terms but also in terms of military and civilian casualties. Ground invasions, particularly when conducted in densely populated urban environments such as Gaza or Southern Lebanon, invariably carry a high risk of causing significant civilian casualties and provoking widespread international condemnation, potentially undermining Israel’s strategic objectives and international standing. Furthermore, the very effectiveness of conventional forces against determined and highly adaptable non-state actors, who have demonstrably excelled in developing and deploying asymmetric tactics, urban warfare strategies, and tunnel warfare capabilities, is far from guaranteed. Zamir’s paramount challenge will be to deftly craft a revised military doctrine that strategically blends the undeniable strengths of conventional warfare – firepower, manoeuvrability, and decisive force projection – with the crucial lessons rigorously learned from the protracted and often inconclusive asymmetric conflicts of recent decades, thereby creating a future-oriented force that is not only formidably powerful but also strategically adaptable and effectively responsive to the diverse and evolving spectrum of security challenges that Israel confronts in the 21^st century.

The most immediate and predictably recurring threat remains the potential, if not inevitability, of renewed conflict in the Gaza Strip. The deeply ingrained conviction that “the war with Gaza has not stopped yet, and may resume” powerfully reflects the intractable nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly in Gaza, and the tragically cyclical pattern of escalating violence followed by fragile ceasefires. Despite successive large-scale military operations conducted by Israel over the past decade and a half, Hamas, as the de facto governing power in Gaza, demonstrably remains firmly in control of the Gaza Strip, and the fundamental, underlying issues that perpetually fuel the conflict – the ongoing Israeli blockade, the dire humanitarian crisis within Gaza, and the completely unresolved political status of the territory – remain fundamentally unchanged. Therefore, a renewed confrontation in Gaza, potentially triggered by a breakdown of the tenuous prisoner swap deal currently in place or by a perceived act of provocation from either side, appears to be not just a possibility, but a disturbingly high probability in the foreseeable future.

Hezbollah remains a demonstrably formidable and highly capable adversary of Israel, possessing a vast arsenal of rockets and missiles capable of reaching deep into Israeli territory, and extensive combat experience gained in regional conflicts, most notably the Syrian Civil War. The northern border between Israel and Lebanon, therefore, remains a persistently volatile and acutely dangerous flashpoint, and any perceived escalation or miscalculation on either side could rapidly ignite a renewed and potentially devastating conflict.

The doctrinal shift towards a more robust, ground-oriented military posture, could be strategically interpreted not only as preparation for future Gaza operations but also as a pre-emptive measure intended to deter Hezbollah, or, if deterrence fails, to enable the IDF to conduct a more decisive and potentially larger-scale ground operation in Southern Lebanon, should conflict erupt along the northern border.

Most alarmingly and unexpectedly, the possibility of a “seventh front” opening with Turkey in the complex and increasingly volatile Syrian theatre. While acknowledging upfront that this specific hypothesis “seems unlikely so far,” the mere fact that “Israelis are taking it into consideration and talking about it publicly” is exceptionally significant and warrants careful consideration. The rapidly expanding and increasingly entrenched Turkish military presence within Syria, particularly in areas that directly border or are geographically proximate to Israeli-controlled territory, especially the Golan Heights, is now being perceived in some Israeli security circles as a potential, albeit currently low-probability, source of future friction and even direct military confrontation. Turkish army was built and still is today as a ground combat army, explicitly highlighting the substantial conventional military capabilities of Turkey – a NATO member with a large, well-equipped, and increasingly assertive military – and the potential for a large-scale, conventional, force-on-force conflict scenario should geopolitical tensions between Israel and Turkey significantly escalate and spill over into military confrontation, particularly in the already overcrowded and exceptionally complex Syrian battlespace.

This emerging and previously unforeseen Turkish dimension introduces a profoundly new and potentially destabilizing element into Israel’s already overburdened security calculations, demanding a radical doctrinal approach capable of effectively addressing not only the familiar threats posed by non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah but also the qualitatively different and far more challenging threat environment posed by increasingly capable and regionally assertive state militaries, such as that of Turkey.

To sum up, Eyal Zamir’s ascension to the position of Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army arrives at a uniquely critical and precarious juncture in Israel’s history. He is not simply entrusted with leading the IDF in its current operational posture; he is fundamentally tasked with strategically reshaping its very doctrine, comprehensively recalibrating its force structure, and preparing it for an increasingly complex and dangerous future security environment characterized by rapidly evolving threats and eroding regional stability. The anticipated and strategically significant shift towards a more conventionally oriented, ground-centric military posture, reflects a fundamental strategic re-evaluation driven by hard-won lessons from recent and often inconclusive conflicts, coupled with a growing, and perhaps unsettling, sense of profound insecurity in a Middle East region that is becoming progressively more volatile and unpredictable.

However, Zamir embarks upon this monumental undertaking while facing a daunting array of formidable challenges a potentially strained and distrustful political relationship with the Netanyahu government, the inherent complexity of effectively balancing and integrating both conventional and asymmetric warfare capabilities within a single, unified doctrine, and the acutely concerning and increasingly realistic threat of multiple, potentially simultaneous, military conflicts erupting across Gaza, Lebanon, and even, hypothetically, Syria.

His ultimate success – or failure – in strategically navigating this exceptionally treacherous and multifaceted landscape will be absolutely crucial, not only for the immediate and long-term operational effectiveness and strategic preparedness of the IDF, but far more consequentially, for Israel’s enduring national security, its long-term geopolitical trajectory, and its precarious place within an increasingly turbulent and dangerous Middle East region. Whether Zamir can effectively lead the IDF through this comprehensive doctrinal and operational transformation, and whether this newly adopted strategic direction will ultimately serve to demonstrably enhance Israel’s long-term security and regional stability, remains an open and urgently pressing question. The coming months and years will undoubtedly represent a critical and potentially decisive period of testing and profound transformation for Zamir personally and the newly configured Israeli Army strategically placed under his command.

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عبد الله علي عسكر، سجل مليء بالمجازر.. من هو إيال زامير رئيس أركان الاحتلال القادم؟،القاهرة الإخبارية، 2 فبراير 2025، تاريخ الاطلاع: 10 فبراير 2025، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://alqaheranews.net/news/115318/%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A1-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%B1-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%88-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A3%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%85

نظير مجلي، إيال زامير… رئيس الأركان الإسرائيلي الجديد عسكري من خارج معارك السياسة، الشرق الأوسط، 22 فبراير 2025، تاريخ الاطلاع: 25 فبراير 2025، متاح على الرابط التالي:  https://aawsat.com/%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%82/%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B9/5114766-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9

نظير مجلي، ما أولويات الرئيس الجديد لأركان الجيش الإسرائيلي؟، الشرق الأوسط، 2 فبراير 2025، تاريخ الاطلاع: 10 فبراير 2025، متاح على الرابط التالي: https://aawsat.com/%D8%B4%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9/5107794-%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%9F