Restoring Lost Deterrence: Pager Explosions in Lebanon

In a well-coordinated assault targeting Lebanon’s southern suburbs—an area known for being a Hezbollah stronghold—and specific regions in Syria, hundreds of pager devices used by Lebanese Hezbollah members were detonated simultaneously. Early reports, at the time of writing, suggest the attack claimed the lives of over a dozen individuals and left thousands more injured.

Israel has a long-established record of carrying out extrajudicial operations, ranging from targeted assassinations to sophisticated cyber-attacks aimed at its adversaries. A hallmark of its tactics includes booby-trapping communications devices, as seen in the 1996 assassination of Yahya Ayyash, a prominent Hamas bomb maker, who was killed using a bomb concealed within his mobile phone. Given this precedent, it is plausible that Israeli intelligence, specifically the Mossad, orchestrated the recent operation by infiltrating the manufacturing process of these pager devices, possibly embedding lithium-ion batteries rigged with meticulously calibrated explosives.

The operation raises many questions about the strength of the security of Hezbollah’s communications infrastructure, which calls for looking at the incident from a deeper perspective to decipher its meanings and implications from the perspective of the communications security used by Hezbollah or other resistance groups in the region or even regular armies in the Middle East.

Mossad’s resolve to reassert its dominance in deterrence operations is a key driving factor behind the pager attack. Prior to the events of October 7, Israeli intelligence had garnered a formidable reputation among global intelligence agencies. The successive assassinations carried out by Israel—including Hamas deputy leader Saleh Al-Arouri in Beirut on January 2 and senior Hezbollah figure Fouad Shukr in late July, followed closely by the targeting of Ismail Haniyeh—highlight a pattern of calculated strikes designed to destabilise these organisations’ leadership structures. These successive operations have gained Israeli intelligence new ground in undermining the mutual trust between Hezbollah’s leadership and its members, as reaching thousands of members at once without military action means that a profound shortcoming on the part of the militant group’s leadership has cost them blood.

Israel may have also achieved one of its most important declared goals, which is to neutralise Hezbollah’s combat capabilities, which enable it to launch attacks on the Israeli interior, in light of the United States’ (U.S.) repeated warnings against carrying out a large-scale operation inside Lebanese territory. Therefore, the pager attack may be a painful blow to the trust between Hezbollah’s leadership and its members in preparation for launching a large-scale military campaign against the group, or it may be just the latest episode in the long-running shadow war between Israel and Iran’s agents.

The West’s Monopoly of Communications Technology

This incident highlights a critical issue concerning communications and information security—namely, the dominance of Western companies in the communications technology sector, particularly in encrypted communications.

In the case of the pager explosions in Lebanon and Syria, we find that the manufacturer, BAC Consulting KFT, headquartered in Budapest, used the trademark of Taiwanese company Apollo Gold. However, a deeper examination reveals that many such firms are little more than fronts for intelligence agencies. Notably, BAC Consulting was only established in 2022, suggesting that it may serve as a cover for covert operations.

This situation is reminiscent of historical precedents, such as the infamous case of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its use of the Swiss encryption company, “Crypto AG”. Crypto AG, a global leader in encryption technology, was secretly owned by the CIA and German intelligence for decades. Through this front, the CIA managed to intercept and spy on classified communications from more than a hundred nations, including both adversaries and allies of the U.S. Notable operations included monitoring the hostage crisis at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979, providing intelligence to Britain during the Falklands War, and tracking assassination campaigns in Latin America. Such historical parallels further undermine trust in Western-exported technologies within the region.

Primitive as a Solution

The adoption of primitive communication methods dates back to a system first used by Hamas in its formative years, particularly by its political bureau chief, Yahya Sinwar. Sinwar, arrested in 1988 while in Israeli custody, managed to devise an improvised yet highly effective communication system that eluded Israel’s advanced intelligence capabilities. This system, created while Sinwar was imprisoned, enabled Hamas to outmanoeuvre modern surveillance technologies.

Sinwar’s method involved writing a handwritten message passed through a trusted network of Hamas members, each acting as a link in a chain of messengers. The messages were often encrypted with codes tailored for different recipients and specific circumstances to protect the content further. Once the message reached an intermediary in Gaza or a designated Hamas operative, the final communication could be relayed via telephone or other indirect means to members stationed abroad.

If not for Sinwar’s rudimentary, technology-free system, he might not have survived Israel’s aggressive intelligence and counterterrorism efforts. He consistently avoids electronic communications such as phone calls and text messages—methods Israel frequently exploits to target and eliminate leaders of armed factions. As a result, Sinwar’s reliance on low-tech solutions has evolved, becoming increasingly cautious and sophisticated, offering a unique blend of simplicity and security that has been key to his survival.

Preliminary evidence indicates that the attack significantly disrupted Hezbollah’s command and control infrastructure in Lebanon. This impact is particularly acute as Hezbollah had relied on outdated communication technologies, such as pagers, likely under the assumption that these devices were immune to modern cyber infiltration.

In the aftermath of the October 7 attack, Hezbollah members had already begun minimising their use of cell phones, heeding warnings from the group’s secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah. In a televised speech on February 13, 2024, Nasrallah urged fighters to switch to alternative communication methods following the loss of approximately 170 fighters in targeted Israeli strikes, including the assassination of Saleh Al-Arouri in Beirut. The group’s shift toward pagers appeared strategic, believing they could evade Israel’s advanced surveillance capabilities. However, this latest attack reveals a fatal vulnerability in Hezbollah’s approach.

The strike may also have been intended to sow fear and uncertainty among the Lebanese population, many of whom are politically divided and do not support Hezbollah. This tactic could be part of a broader strategy to weaken Hezbollah’s standing within Lebanon, exploiting the country’s internal divisions. Since Hamas’s October 7 attacks on southern Israel, Israeli leadership has made it clear that eliminating the Hezbollah threat is now a priority, particularly given the group’s ongoing solidarity with Hamas. Just hours before the pager attack, the Netanyahu government underscored its broader war aims, which include facilitating the return of tens of thousands of Israeli residents to their homes in northern Israel, from which they fled due to continuous Hezbollah rocket fire. The simultaneous detonation of the pagers could signal the beginning of a larger, more comprehensive Israeli military campaign aimed at dismantling Hezbollah’s military capabilities.

In conclusion, the coordinated mass attack on Hezbollah’s pagers underscores Israel’s capacity to strike its adversaries at will, regardless of time or place. The pager explosions could signify a broader escalation, especially in light of recent events, including Israel’s major assault on Syria that left 18 dead and the Houthis’ launch of a hypersonic missile at Israel. Israel likely perceives a mounting escalation across all theatres of the “Axis of Resistance,” including those beyond Lebanon, marking a critical moment in the potential dismantling of Hezbollah’s operational capabilities.

In response, Hezbollah is expected to undertake a comprehensive overhaul of its internal security apparatus, identifying and addressing vulnerabilities in its operational security. This reform effort will likely involve strengthening the professionalism of its members, particularly in terms of communication protocols. Additionally, Hezbollah may initiate an internal purge, hunting down possible infiltrators or spies within the organisation. Such a crackdown could result in internal bloodshed—an outcome that would serve as a strategic advantage for Israeli intelligence, further destabilising Hezbollah.

Beyond Lebanon, this attack will likely prompt Hezbollah’s regional allies—such as the Houthis in Yemen, militant groups in Iraq and Syria, and other Iranian proxies—to adopt heightened security measures. These groups may rethink their communication methods, disrupting coordination and complicating their capacity to carry out operations. The ripple effects of this incident are bound to extend far beyond Lebanon, with militant factions worldwide questioning the security of their communication devices. In seeking alternatives, many may turn to the East, particularly Russia and China, as their nearest sources for acquiring more secure communications technology.