Middle East

The Kurdish dream of establishing an independent state was on the verge of realisation after centuries of demands in Jan. 1946. This came when “Qazi Mohammad,” the Iranian Kurdish leader, declared the establishment of the Mahabad Republic in the province of the same name, now part of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, this dream quickly dissipated when the Soviet Union withdrew its financial support for the nascent state. The intensification of the economic blockade on the region further compounded the situation, preventing the entry of food supplies and reducing agricultural production. These pressures led to dramatic shifts in the loyalties of Kurdish tribal leaders who had initially allied with “Qazi” during the state's formation, hoping to secure a share of Soviet financial and food aid.   The food situation worsened over time, pushing some leaders of the Mahabad army to leave the capital, especially as Iranian forces were nearing its entrance, leaving the Kurdish leader and a small Kurdish group behind to face an unequal battle with the Iranian army. Therefore, to spare Kurdish blood, it was decided to surrender on December 15 of the same year, leading to the Iranian army's occupation of Mahabad and the declaration of the state's fall. In the end, “Qazi” was executed in March 1947, marking the end of the closest attempt to establish a Kurdish state.   About a quarter of a century later, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court issued a series of rulings regarding Iraqi oil exported by the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The latest ruling, issued in Feb. 2024, mandated the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Council of Ministers to hand over all oil and non-oil revenues to the central government in Baghdad. This could have a dual impact similar to that caused by the cessation of financial support and the Iranian blockade on the Mahabad army, but this time it affects the Peshmerga forces that represent the hope for preserving the “autonomy” of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq considered the second closest Kurdish attempt at establishing a national homeland for the Kurds.   Therefore, the First Part of this paper addresses the political situation of the Kurds, focusing on the status of the region in the Iraqi Constitution, the contentious issues between the region and the federal government, and the impact of these disputes on the continuity and existence of the Peshmerga. The Second Part reviews the economic situation, examining the effects of the series of judicial rulings on the conditions that undermine the autonomy of the regional government in selling oil and the repercussions of this on the Peshmerga as a Kurdish defence force that protects the “autonomy” of the region, forming the last line of defence against its collapse.

Saudi Arabia is undergoing a remarkable transformation across various sectors. Fuelled by ambitious reforms under Vision 2030. The Kingdom’s economy is not only reaching new heights, having recently achieved trillion-dollar status, but also aiming to be among the leading economies in the world. This economic shift is driven by diversification and substantial investments, fundamentally changing the country’s economic structure and aiming at strengthening its global position.   Another key driver of this growth is the rise in female participation in the workforce through increased educational opportunities, and a more inclusive cultural environment. Saudi Arabia has implemented significant reforms to empower women economically, creating a positive impact that extends beyond 2030 vision. As a result, the country is witnessing a significant boost in economic growth demonstrating the transformative power of women’s empowerment.

The dream of Greater Israel is not fictional but real, first developed by Theodore Hertzel, the founding father of Zionism, Greater Israel include all lands from the Nile in Egypt to the Euphrates in Iraq. This includes territories from Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, all Jordanian territory, and all historical Palestine. In 2017, the United Nations issued a report indicating that Israel is proceeding with its plans to annex Palestinian lands in the West Bank while keeping Palestinians in severe conditions of isolation and deprivation. Moreover, soldiers of the Israeli army have worn badges showing Greater Israel during military operations in Gaza, indicating that Israel might expand its military operations in the Middle East after ending its military operations in Gaza. The pathway to accomplishing the dream of Greater Israel began in November 2024 when Israel entered the demilitarised zone that separates the occupied Syrian Golan Heights. In this area, Israel began establishing a construction project, paving a road along the borders with Syria. What if the Israeli construction project in Syria is the first step to build a corridor that would connect Israel to the Euphrates, thus making Israel closer to achieve the dream of Greater Israel? What will be the consequences if Israel manages to create this corridor?

The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) is a comprehensive document produced by the National Security Council in conjunction with the executive branch of the United States Government for Congress and then signed by the President. The NSS mainly outlines the U.S.’s major national security concerns and how the administration intends to address them using all instruments of national power. In this context, the 2024 NSS will be one of the most crucial concerns for the President-elect Donald Trump.

On Wednesday, Nov. 27, 2024, Syrian armed factions launched a coordinated offensive targeting regime-controlled sites and militia positions in the western countryside of Aleppo, northern Syria. This operation marks the most significant joint military action since 2016, involving key groups such as “Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham” (formerly Jabhat Al-Nusra). In a video statement, the Joint Operations Room declared the initiation of the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation. The announcement emphasised that the offensive was necessitated by recent regime movements threatening civilian areas, framing the operation as a defensive imperative rather than a strategic choice. The statement underscored that this action was in direct retaliation for the Syrian regime's bombardment of north-western regions, signalling a potential escalation in the conflict dynamics of the region.

Turkey has been working on developing its locally-manufactured military capabilities, including drones, for decades, attempting to present itself as a new rising regional power that can affect global politics. Turkey also recognised the importance of drones in supporting ground forces through providing air monitoring services and collecting intelligence about the Kurdistan Working Party (PKK), maximising its motivation to develop locally-made drones. Moreover, due to lack limitations on importing technology from Western powers that share contradictive perspectives with Turkey over issues of refugees, and the Syrian and Libyan Civil Wars. Ankara has paid deep attention to developing its Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), which are publicly known as drones, trying to fill the void of not possessing advanced aircraft such as F-22 or F-35. This analysis explores the different reasons that motivated Turkey to develop UAVs along with the benefits and challenges the Turkish diplomacy experienced.

China is known for using its economic power to infiltrate developing countries, especially those experiencing economic shocks, through providing unconditional loans and increasing its investments in infrastructure. Moreover, China avoids the risk of investing in fragile countries or countries torn out by civil wars, as it might not be a safe environment for long-term investments. In Libya, China has maintained the same policy and avoided playing a crucial role in affecting the outcomes of the Libyan conflict. It, however, preferred to maintain a strong connection with the different local parties engaged in this conflict to preserve its interests and ensure having an economic role in the future of the country. This analysis is going to deeply explore the Chinese role in Libya along with future prospects.

The Israeli military has reportedly launched a recruitment campaign offering asylum seekers residency in exchange for their service in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The Israeli government already struggling with a shortage in manpower needed for its war on multiple fronts including in Gaza and Lebanon. While this policy is not totally pioneered by Israelis, it faces serious legal and humanitarian repercussions. Additionally, it adds a layer of uncertainty to the fate of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe who might face the same fate as asylum seekers in Israel given the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War and problems with conscription.

A whole year has passed since Hamas' military operations in the Gaza Strip Envelope, marking what many considered the first Palestinian incursion into Israeli territory since the war that led to Israel’s establishment in the late 1940s. The war resulted in the capture of dozens of Israelis and the deaths of hundreds more. In response, Israel launched its most extensive military campaign since the 1973 Sixth of October War, aiming to rebuild its fragmented deterrence capabilities and restore its diminished regional stature. This effort involved tens of thousands of airstrikes and the monthly deployment of approximately 10,000 artillery shells. Over 66% of the buildings in Gaza were damaged, with about 163,700 structures affected, including the complete destruction of 52,500 buildings. The human cost was equally staggering, with over 41,000 Palestinian fatalities recorded. The situation remains unresolved, leaving the war's toll ongoing. The destruction has not been confined to Gaza alone. The financial and reputational costs for Israel have been severe. Though the thousands of missile attacks launched by Hamas had limited impact on Israel's critical infrastructure, they significantly undermined its economy and tarnished its image as a secure, advanced economy. This prompts a thorough analysis of the war's impact on Israel's economic stability over the past year and a projection of its potential long-term consequences.

The Israel-Hamas War has now entered its second year following the unexpected assault by Palestinian factions on Israel on October 7, 2023. This sudden attack disrupted Israel’s long-held sense of security, undermining public confidence in both the Israeli military and its intelligence apparatus. In response to the incursion, the Israeli military launched a devastating offensive on Gaza, resulting in over 41,500 fatalities and leaving 96,000 others wounded Moreover, a punitive blockade has severely cut off essential supplies of food, energy, water, and medicine, crippling Gaza’s already fragile healthcare system. The blockade, coupled with ongoing military strikes, has devastated key infrastructure, housing, the economy, agricultural lands, and fishing fleets. This has pushed nearly half a million people into a state of food insecurity.   Israel has consistently forced Gaza’s residents to relocate into increasingly confined areas, with the number of displaced individuals now reaching nearly 1.9 million. The widespread devastation has led the United Nations to issue repeated warnings, cautioning that Israel’s actions are rendering Gaza uninhabitable.   After a year of war, Israel has failed to achieve its primary objectives. Hamas remains intact, and the prisoners held by its factions have not been released. Instead, the war has widened, with violence escalating beyond Gaza and into the West Bank, while tensions between Israel and Iran, along with its regional proxies, have intensified. This escalation has pushed the Middle East to the brink of a broader confrontation, potentially setting the stage for a full-scale war between Israel, Iran, and its respective proxies. As hopes for a ceasefire and prisoner exchange dwindle, pressing questions now emerge: Who stands to lose and who will benefit from this protracted war? When and how will Israel’s war conclude, and what will be left in its wake?   This analysis highlights the gains and losses of the most important parties to the conflict as follows:

China has mediated a Palestinian reconciliation dialogue in Beijing, and has succeeded in bridging the rift between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These steps indicate a change in China's approach to the Middle East, as it has become an active player in the region by expanding its policies to include political and strategic considerations, in addition to its energy interests. Its "non-interventionist" policy has attracted many countries in the region, which see their growing relations with Beijing as a means of diversification. However, China's increasing involvement may pose a threat to US interests in the region. As Washington has increasingly focused on the Indo-Pacific region, China has emerged as an active player in the Middle East, reshaping regional security dynamics, signing strategic partnerships and memoranda of understanding for its economic activities with most Middle Eastern countries, and strengthening its ties with various regional organizations over the past two decades. Recent Chinese diplomatic initiatives demonstrate Beijing’s deep investment in further developing relations with Middle Eastern countries, with Beijing hosting the Arab-Chinese Summit and the Gulf-China Summit, demonstrating its commitment to strengthening strategic partnerships among the region’s countries and promoting economic development beyond its traditional energy interests. China’s growing engagement in the Middle East is seen as a significant factor shaping the region’s geopolitical landscape and has significant implications for global politics. This raises the question: how China’s methods diverge from those of the United States (U.S.) in the region?

In a move with significant political and economic implications, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi embarked on an official visit to Ankara Sept. 4, 2024. This highly anticipated visit comes months after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to Egypt earlier this year and his invitation to President El-Sisi to Ankara. The current visit, considered a turning point in Egyptian-Turkish relations, aims to strengthen bilateral cooperation and open new avenues for coordination on regional and international issues. After a decade of tension and estrangement in the relations between Egypt and Turkey.   The Egyptian President's visit to Turkey is of special importance, as it is the culmination of a long phase of discussions aimed at restoring relations between Egypt and Turkey to their normal course. The rounds of talks and meetings concluded with Erdogan's visit to Cairo last February, which witnessed the announcement of the revival of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council for relations between the two countries in its new form, where both leaders co-chair the first meeting of the Council. The meeting also involved a comprehensive review of the Egyptian-Turkish bilateral relations and discussions on potential steps to further enhance the Egyptian-Turkish cooperation.   This analysis highlights the motivations of this visit and its implications on regional and Turkish politics.