Bab el-Mandeb

Turkey has a deep interest in the Horn of Africa and considers it as the gate to the East of the continent. Since 2011, Turkey has increased its humanitarian aid to Somalia, signed military and economic agreements and contributed to the process of state-building through allowing its companies to construct infrastructure, schools, hospital, and governmental premises. In 2017, Turkey has opened the largest military base, known as TURKSOM, beyond its borders to fully qualify the Somali army to deter the threat arising from the Al-Shabab movement that has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States (U.S.) since 2008.   In February 2024, Turkey signed significant military and economic agreements with Somalia, allowing it to a key player in the politics of Horn of Africa. According to the 10-year pact, Turkey will help Somalia to defend its maritime against piracy, smuggling, and foreign intervention from Ethiopia. Turkey is also obliged by the terms of this agreement to train and rebuild the Somali naval forces. The process of rebuilding includes weaponizing the Somali naval forces with Turkish weapons manufactured locally. These weapons include frigates built mainly for the Somali navy, which means that the Turkish military exports will witness an increase of demand on its products in the forthcoming years. This would motivate other countries to buy Turkish weapons, especially if Turkish weapons proved its efficiency in securing Somali maritime. These agreements also enable Turkey to work on extracting natural resources from the Somali territorial water in return for an agreed-upon percentage for Turkey. Some reports revealed that Turkey will receive 30% of the revenues of the Somali economic zone. Somali airspace will also be fully opened for Turkish military use. This analysis explores Turkish motivations of signing this agreement and the challenges that it might confront while implementing it.

The world has been on edge since July 31,2024, awaiting Iran’s response to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, head of the Hamas political bureau, in Tehran by an Israeli attack. Haniyeh was targeted while attending the inauguration ceremony of Iranian President Masoud Pezekshian, marking a direct challenge to Iranian sovereignty and its role as a regional leader of resistance movements. This event underscores the broader confrontation between Iran, which opposes what it perceives as the United States and Israeli dominance in the region. Given the assassination's symbolic and strategic significance, many see Iran’s retaliation as inevitable, particularly amid escalations between Israel and Iran. Notably, this incident is part of a broader series of high-profile killings targeting figures within the so-called resistance axis. Just hours before the explosion in Tehran, Israel launched a missile strike in Beirut's southern suburbs, killing Fouad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah military official, while also claiming—without confirmation—the assassination of Mohammed Deif, a leading Hamas military commander.   While consensus exists regarding the certainty of an Iranian response, there is sharp debate within political and military circles over the nature of this retaliation. The targeted nature of the Israeli strikes suggests that a direct and immediate Iranian response may be needed to restore its deterrent credibility. However, Iran’s extensive network of regional proxies presents an alternative, allowing Tehran to retaliate indirectly while avoiding the military and economic costs of direct confrontation. This calculation has become more critical following the U.S.’s declaration that it would militarily defend Israel against any Iranian attack, reaffirming its earlier stance on Iranian missile strikes against Israel in April.   Predicting the nature of Iran’s response can be facilitated by examining the pattern of its previous reactions to similar attacks, particularly given Iran’s long history of confrontations following the 1979 revolution and its enduring hostility toward the U.S. Among these conflicts, the one most analogous to the current situation is the so-called Tanker War, which took place between Iran and Iraq from 1984 to 1988. Iran successfully drew the U.S. into a large-scale military engagement in the Arabian Gulf during this period. This scenario holds significant parallels to today’s tensions, as will be detailed later.   This paper, therefore, aims to analyse the similarities and differences between Iran’s current posture and its stance during the Tanker War from multiple perspectives—military, political, and economic—both internally externally. By comparing the dynamics at play, including the role of the U.S. in both scenarios, this analysis seeks to clarify what can be expected from Iran in light of these combined variables.

The term “unification of arenas” emerged in the discourse of the Arab-Israeli conflict following the 2021 Sword of Jerusalem Battle. This military and ideological strategy is primarily linked to Iran’s regional proxies within the “axis of resistance.” This coalition includes Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and various Iranian-backed militias in Syria and Iraq. Its objective is to enhance operational coordination among these groups to counter Israel and diminish American influence in the region, aligning with Iranian strategic interests. The approach involves launching simultaneous actions across different fronts, including Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen, to orchestrate a unified battle against common adversaries, particularly Israel and the United States (U.S.).   While this strategy had been employed on a limited scale prior to October 7, it achieved unprecedented levels of coordination following these operations. The execution involved dividing targets within Israel, with coordinated attacks from Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. This meticulous synchronisation and sequence of missile and drone strikes overwhelmed Israeli air defences, with some attacks originating from Yemen and reaching targets in Tel Aviv.   These agents, particularly the Houthis, did not limit their actions to threatening Israeli facilities. Their strikes extended to disrupting navigation in the Bab El Mandab Strait off the Yemeni coast. The Houthis conducted numerous attacks on ships they claimed had ties to Israel, whether through state ownership, ownership by individuals with Israeli citizenship, or simply passing through Israeli ports. This broad targeting strategy encompassed a significant portion of the traffic in this crucial strait for global trade, particularly affecting Arab oil-exporting countries and Egypt, which relies heavily on the Suez Canal for its maritime traffic. As a result, shipping routes have shifted from the Suez Canal to the Cape of Good Hope, prompting long-term strategic transformations and immediate economic repercussions for the Arab countries involved. This analysis aims to assess the Bab El Mandab Strait's importance for Arab countries and explore the strategic implications of its disruption on their economies.