Turkey and Somalia: A New Rising Pact in the Horn of Africa
Programmes
12 Sep 2024

Turkey and Somalia: A New Rising Pact in the Horn of Africa

Turkey has a deep interest in the Horn of Africa and considers it as the gate to the East of the continent. Since 2011, Turkey has increased its humanitarian aid to Somalia, signed military and economic agreements and contributed to the process of state-building through allowing its companies to construct infrastructure, schools, hospital, and governmental premises. In 2017, Turkey has opened the largest military base, known as TURKSOM, beyond its borders to fully qualify the Somali army to deter the threat arising from the Al-Shabab movement that has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States (U.S.) since 2008.   In February 2024, Turkey signed significant military and economic agreements with Somalia, allowing it to a key player in the politics of Horn of Africa. According to the 10-year pact, Turkey will help Somalia to defend its maritime against piracy, smuggling, and foreign intervention from Ethiopia. Turkey is also obliged by the terms of this agreement to train and rebuild the Somali naval forces. The process of rebuilding includes weaponizing the Somali naval forces with Turkish weapons manufactured locally. These weapons include frigates built mainly for the Somali navy, which means that the Turkish military exports will witness an increase of demand on its products in the forthcoming years. This would motivate other countries to buy Turkish weapons, especially if Turkish weapons proved its efficiency in securing Somali maritime. These agreements also enable Turkey to work on extracting natural resources from the Somali territorial water in return for an agreed-upon percentage for Turkey. Some reports revealed that Turkey will receive 30% of the revenues of the Somali economic zone. Somali airspace will also be fully opened for Turkish military use. This analysis explores Turkish motivations of signing this agreement and the challenges that it might confront while implementing it.
Strategic Ramifications of Unrest in Bab El Mandab: The Arab Cost
Programmes

Strategic Ramifications of Unrest in Bab El Mandab: The Arab Cost

The term “unification of arenas” emerged in the discourse of the Arab-Israeli conflict following the 2021 Sword of Jerusalem Battle. This military and ideological strategy is primarily linked to Iran’s regional proxies within the “axis of resistance.” This coalition includes Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and various Iranian-backed militias in Syria and Iraq. Its objective is to enhance operational coordination among these groups to counter Israel and diminish American influence in the region, aligning with Iranian strategic interests. The approach involves launching simultaneous actions across different fronts, including Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen, to orchestrate a unified battle against common adversaries, particularly Israel and the United States (U.S.).   While this strategy had been employed on a limited scale prior to October 7, it achieved unprecedented levels of coordination following these operations. The execution involved dividing targets within Israel, with coordinated attacks from Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. This meticulous synchronisation and sequence of missile and drone strikes overwhelmed Israeli air defences, with some attacks originating from Yemen and reaching targets in Tel Aviv.   These agents, particularly the Houthis, did not limit their actions to threatening Israeli facilities. Their strikes extended to disrupting navigation in the Bab El Mandab Strait off the Yemeni coast. The Houthis conducted numerous attacks on ships they claimed had ties to Israel, whether through state ownership, ownership by individuals with Israeli citizenship, or simply passing through Israeli ports. This broad targeting strategy encompassed a significant portion of the traffic in this crucial strait for global trade, particularly affecting Arab oil-exporting countries and Egypt, which relies heavily on the Suez Canal for its maritime traffic. As a result, shipping routes have shifted from the Suez Canal to the Cape of Good Hope, prompting long-term strategic transformations and immediate economic repercussions for the Arab countries involved. This analysis aims to assess the Bab El Mandab Strait's importance for Arab countries and explore the strategic implications of its disruption on their economies.