Mahabad: Oil, the Peshmerga, and the Collapse of the Kurdish Dream

China has mediated a Palestinian reconciliation dialogue in Beijing, and has succeeded in bridging the rift between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These steps indicate a change in China's approach to the Middle East, as it has become an active player in the region by expanding its policies to include political and strategic considerations, in addition to its energy interests. Its "non-interventionist" policy has attracted many countries in the region, which see their growing relations with Beijing as a means of diversification. However, China's increasing involvement may pose a threat to US interests in the region. As Washington has increasingly focused on the Indo-Pacific region, China has emerged as an active player in the Middle East, reshaping regional security dynamics, signing strategic partnerships and memoranda of understanding for its economic activities with most Middle Eastern countries, and strengthening its ties with various regional organizations over the past two decades. Recent Chinese diplomatic initiatives demonstrate Beijing’s deep investment in further developing relations with Middle Eastern countries, with Beijing hosting the Arab-Chinese Summit and the Gulf-China Summit, demonstrating its commitment to strengthening strategic partnerships among the region’s countries and promoting economic development beyond its traditional energy interests. China’s growing engagement in the Middle East is seen as a significant factor shaping the region’s geopolitical landscape and has significant implications for global politics. This raises the question: how China’s methods diverge from those of the United States (U.S.) in the region?

The world has been on edge since July 31,2024, awaiting Iran’s response to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, head of the Hamas political bureau, in Tehran by an Israeli attack. Haniyeh was targeted while attending the inauguration ceremony of Iranian President Masoud Pezekshian, marking a direct challenge to Iranian sovereignty and its role as a regional leader of resistance movements. This event underscores the broader confrontation between Iran, which opposes what it perceives as the United States and Israeli dominance in the region. Given the assassination's symbolic and strategic significance, many see Iran’s retaliation as inevitable, particularly amid escalations between Israel and Iran. Notably, this incident is part of a broader series of high-profile killings targeting figures within the so-called resistance axis. Just hours before the explosion in Tehran, Israel launched a missile strike in Beirut's southern suburbs, killing Fouad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah military official, while also claiming—without confirmation—the assassination of Mohammed Deif, a leading Hamas military commander.   While consensus exists regarding the certainty of an Iranian response, there is sharp debate within political and military circles over the nature of this retaliation. The targeted nature of the Israeli strikes suggests that a direct and immediate Iranian response may be needed to restore its deterrent credibility. However, Iran’s extensive network of regional proxies presents an alternative, allowing Tehran to retaliate indirectly while avoiding the military and economic costs of direct confrontation. This calculation has become more critical following the U.S.’s declaration that it would militarily defend Israel against any Iranian attack, reaffirming its earlier stance on Iranian missile strikes against Israel in April.   Predicting the nature of Iran’s response can be facilitated by examining the pattern of its previous reactions to similar attacks, particularly given Iran’s long history of confrontations following the 1979 revolution and its enduring hostility toward the U.S. Among these conflicts, the one most analogous to the current situation is the so-called Tanker War, which took place between Iran and Iraq from 1984 to 1988. Iran successfully drew the U.S. into a large-scale military engagement in the Arabian Gulf during this period. This scenario holds significant parallels to today’s tensions, as will be detailed later.   This paper, therefore, aims to analyse the similarities and differences between Iran’s current posture and its stance during the Tanker War from multiple perspectives—military, political, and economic—both internally externally. By comparing the dynamics at play, including the role of the U.S. in both scenarios, this analysis seeks to clarify what can be expected from Iran in light of these combined variables.

A recent statement from the European Union Foreign Policy Commissioner, Josep Borrell, urging Israel's allies, notably Washington, to cease supplying weapons to Israel has ignited widespread controversy. This call comes amid heightened concerns over the significant civilian deaths in the Gaza Strip. Coinciding with this plea, a Dutch appeals court decision has prohibited the export of all spare parts for F-35 fighter jets destined for Israel. These developments unfold against the backdrop of Israel's plans to initiate an expanded military operation in Rafah. Such an operation raises the spectre of a potential humanitarian catastrophe, particularly concerning the over 1.3 million displaced individuals from the Gaza Strip who have sought refuge in Rafah since the commencement of military activities in the enclave.   The United States provides Israel with annual military aid worth $3.8 billion, which stands as one of the most substantial military aid packages supplied by the U.S. to any country globally. This commitment was reaffirmed by U.S. officials, including President Joseph Biden, who, during his tenure as Vice President under Barack Obama, emphasised the enduring strategic alliance between the two countries. Then Vice President Biden said the U.S. commitment to Israel transcends moral obligations and is a deeply rooted strategic obligation. During a visit to Tel Aviv amid the events of Oct. 7, he underscored that “the existence of an independent and secure Israel within globally recognised borders aligns with the practical strategic interests of the United States.” He further emphasised, “I have long said: If Israel didn't exist, we would have to invent it.” Evidence of the depth of relations and continued support is further demonstrated by Congress' approval of an additional $14.1 billion in military aid to Israel. This aid is intended to bolster Israel's capabilities in its conflict with the Hamas movement, specifically by providing air and missile defence support and replenishing U.S. military stock granted to Israel. This level of support echoes the assistance provided by the United States to Israel during the October 1973 War with the Egyptian Army.   The generous and unconditional support provided by the U.S. to Israel prompts numerous inquiries, particularly in the context of the U.S.'s inability to exert pressure on Israel to stop its war on Gaza. Additionally, its loss of control over the right-wing government's decision-making process regarding the potential expansion of the war to include Rafah, portending an imminent conflict with Egypt. Hence, this analysis endeavours to address a pivotal question: Will these developments prompt a shift in the U.S. stance toward Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing government, potentially leading to a withdrawal from the notion of an expanded operation in Rafah? Furthermore, can the United States feasibly cease its military aid to this strategic ally in the Middle East?

According to the McKinsey Global Institute report between 400 million and 800 million people worldwide could be displaced by automation and need to find new occupations by 2030, with 75 million to 375 million of those affected need to move to another new jobs and learn new skills.   Over the last two decades, there has been a surge in interest in automation and digital technologies, as well as their implications for our societies. Several writers have calculated experimentally the impact of automation technologies on employment and people by examining technology adoption at the business or industry level in previous years and related this to labour market outcomes, but their conclusions have been mixed. Some studies find that automation technologies positively impact employment, while others show that they have a negative impact.   Our study examined the impact of automation on UAE in terms of demographics, employment and economic sectors by implementing several scenarios of automation. These scenarios revealed that, in most cases, automation will positively impact UAE in terms of some macroeconomic indicators, and will lead to its economic growth and stability. Finally, we provided some recommendations that will enhance and facilitate the transition to automation in the UAE.

Several indicators point out to the rise of far-right wing within the European bloc including polls for the upcoming European elections and the migration deal which was passed by the French parliament last December. Far right sentiments are reflected on many issues especially Migration which holds second place in the list of most pressing issues for European voters. The New European Migration Pact, which exempts Ukrainians from the new measures, reflects European leanings towards the right adding more restrictions on Migrants, refugees and Asylum seekers especially those arriving from the Middle East and Africa. The far-right leanings do not only hold significance for the European Union (EU) but they will definitely impact neighboring countries especially countries of North Africa who act as a transit for refugees and asylum seekers aiming at reaching European shores. Migrants, refugees and asylum seekers will face catastrophic humanitarian situation due the Pact’s measures such as the screening procedure which will lead to diminished safeguards and a risk of mass detention at the borders, including for children, in countries of first arrival, the Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation which regulates what happens if there is a “crisis” at the EU’s external border. European countries themselves will be put in an unenviable position due to transit countries’ levering their geopolitical positions. Using a multi-faceted criterion, the paper argues that the new pact is just a “rebranding” of ongoing European migration policies which are found to be unsuccessful. The paper uses the EU-Turkey migration deal showcasing shortcomings of European migration policies. Findings suggest that, among other losses, far-right measures taken by EU states tend to embolden transit countries vis-a-vis European states who will lose on the political as well as the economic side. Politically, they will have to make concessions in face of transit states while economically they will have to pay huge amounts of aid for the sake of borders’ externalization and keeping migrants away.

Abstract The post-World War II arrangements generated several decisions that granted the victorious countries certain powers, most notably The Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security, the Four Power Declaration, and Articles 106 and 107 of the United Nations Charter. Questions have recently been raised about the possibility of exploiting these powers to legitimize Russian intervention in Ukraine. However, given the nature and background of these articles and decisions, it turns out that they were part of the arrangements for a transitional period, followed by the transfer of these powers and tasks to the United Nations, and the subsequent new arrangements, most notably the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Russian Federation, which arranged for a new legal situation. This does not contradict the rule of inheriting international treaties as one of the principles of international law but takes into account the change in the new legal status of states. Therefore, the countries that were under the guise of the Soviet Union have become independent members in the United Nations General Assembly, and by reviewing the contents of the documented sessions of the United Nations since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, it turns out that the defenses and arguments presented by the Russian delegate to legitimize the Russian intervention in Ukraine were based on two main arguments, which were repeated in most of the Russian President’s speeches. For the Russian Federation, especially the speech of the declaration of invasion, which was based on Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which guarantees the right of states to defend themselves against threats, and Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that all peoples have the right to self-determination, meaning that any Russian ethnic minority in Ukraine has the right to determine its political status and to pursue its economic, social and cultural development.   Since Putin announced his intention to invade Ukraine militarily, numerous analyses came up that the legal arguments Russia depend on to justify the invasion, and the talk about the arrangements made after World War II that gave the powers to the victorious nations that could be exploited by the Russian side has increased recently. There is even a rumor that claims that the Russian president talked to the secretary-general of the United Nations about the article contained in the United Nations charter and these arguments depended on two articles; 106 and 107 in the United Nations charter, that gives the right to the victorious countries and nations to take any needed decision against the countries that fought against them in World War II to avoid revising the results of World War II. In these decisions, it is specially allowed to utilize military power against these countries.

According to a report by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on the state of food security and nutrition in the world in 2022, it is estimated that between 702 and 828 million people were affected by hunger in 2021, consisting of 278 million people in Africa, 425 million in Asia, and 56.5 million in Latin America and the Caribbean. The number has grown by about 150 million since the outbreak of Covid-19. The Russia-Ukraine War, involving two of the biggest producers in agriculture and staple cereals globally, is disrupting supply chains and further affecting global grain, fertilizer, and energy prices, leading to shortages and fuelling even higher food price inflation. Additionally, food security is a significant challenge in the Arab region, which is facing rising economic, socio-political, and environmental challenges impacting the food security of its growing population.   Hence, our study has examined the factors that affect food security, and our analysis allowed us to determine the top five factors affecting food security: climate change, conflict, overpopulation, inflation, and scarce resources. The study will analyze each factor separately and their effect on food security globally and in many regions, with a focus on the Arab region. Secondly, the study will analyze factors of food insecurity separately and its impact on four significant countries: Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.   We found that the factors we examined have mainly negative effects on food security, with the exception of climate change, which will positively affect some regions for the time being, and natural resources, which has some aspects that effect food security positively. Additionally, we found that the factors are interconnected since for example, conflict negatively affects food security, and it could increase food prices, as in the current Russia-Ukraine War. Likewise, the adverse impacts of climate change are expected to raise food prices further and dampen the region’s food demand translating into direct increases in malnutrition levels.   Finally, after reviewing the effects of factors on food security, we elaborated some recommendations in order to deal with the adverse effects.

One of the most critical issues currently facing the Middle East is the changing composition of its demographic structure. A massive cohort of young people — known as a youth bulge — is challenging policymakers, with youth policies affecting security, education, the labour market, and welfare programs, among other areas. Given the relative stability and wealth of the Gulf states, this is an issue that is not often associated with the region. However, handling a growing young population is just as challenging in the Gulf.   The Gulf is one of the wealthiest regions worldwide; in terms of GDP per capita, it is distinctive due to its unique hydrocarbon reserves compared to a relatively small national population. Gulf states rely on oil revenue — to varying degrees — to attract private investors and provide extensive public services and subsidies to nationals. With not enough diversification in their economies, government spending in the Gulf states will continue to be a barrier to economic diversification. To sustain the high standard of living attained by Emirati and Saudi societies to the youth and the coming generations, the two countries must set strategies and plans to integrate youth while continuing to diversify their economies away from oil. This study explores the impact of the post-oil reforms and strategy on the youth, including education, employment, social contract, and identity.   The study applies Late Rentier State Theory to analyse the relationship between youth, the Emirati and Saudi states, the post-oil reforms, and their future trajectories. The analysis is guided by some of the characteristics identified by Late RST which focus on the impact of globalization, modernization policies, diversification, the state’s encouragement of entrepreneurship, and the sustainability of their strategies with regards to the extent to which they accommodate youth’s needs and account for changing societal structures and expectations.   While the study does not refute the youth bulge hypothesis, which contends that states where young adults constitute a large proportion of the population are expected to face an elevated risk of political violence and interstate conflict, widely used in the literature; it adds to it by proposing that while those risks exist, they can be alleviated under certain circumstances. Those circumstances include policies and strategies to be taken by governments that are relevant to youth needs and the surrounding environment. Namely, taking into consideration both agency and structure.   The study finds that, for the United Arab Emirates, the results of education and Emiratisation policies are likely to shape the shifting social contract between young Emiratis and the government, and could lead to a range of outcomes, from the promising- a population of empowered, educated, and skilled Emirati youth- to the stagnant- disappointed and apathetic youth persistent in their preference of the public sector- to the more worrisome- yet unlikely- active opposition by dissatisfied youth.   With regards to the Kingdom Saudi Arabia, the study finds that while the government is investing massively in educational and employment reforms, young Saudis need to adopt entrepreneurial values and work ethic to ensure the success of “Neo-Saudism". This in turn requires a certain level of responsiveness from the government and possibly more opportunities for youth to participate in decision making in the near future. The speed of change and the extent to which youth’s values and perspectives may clash with those of older generations is yet to be determined. The real challenge for Saudi decision makers and strategists will be in maintaining balance and stable relations between different societal groups.

Nuclear cooperation attracts international and regional attention, many Arab countries have aspired to produce clean nuclear energy and have either begun or are seeking to join the nuclear energy club. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) , Egypt, and Jordan, are the frontrunners in the Middle East and therefore will be the focus of this paper. Nuclear power is an international industry in terms of operation, supply chains, and vendors, as well as nuclear safety, non-proliferation and waste management, therefore, there is an ongoing need for cooperation and collaboration between states. This cooperation can include sharing technical expertise and nuclear technology, establishing agreements that facilitate nuclear exports, agreements on nuclear safety and standards, and collaboration with regulatory frameworks.   The paper employs horizontal or environmental scanning to analyse the current position of nuclear energy in each country and their preparedness for nuclear cooperation, as well as existing models of nuclear cooperation in other regions. Thereafter, the paper explores the different incentives countries may have for engaging in nuclear cooperation, including the potential benefits to be gained. A SWOT analysis is used to structure the environmental scanning, evaluating the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats within each country with regards to their potential role and contribution to nuclear cooperation in addition to an overall SWOT analysis of the countries as a whole with regards to the prospect of ongoing collaboration.   The paper is divided into three chapters; the first chapter provides an overview of nuclear energy in each of the selected countries, the second chapter examines existing models of nuclear cooperation and analyses the different enabling factors which will later be used to identify opportunities for Arab nuclear collaboration, and the third chapter analyses the various economic, political, and security incentives that would drive countries to seek cooperation or that can be used to advocate for greater collaboration among policymakers.   A cooperation model is produced as a result of this analysis, highlighting key characteristics of the ideal regional partnership. Three scenarios for Arab nuclear cooperation are evaluated to demonstrate what could occur if this proposed cooperation occurs, how it would happen, and the scenarios of no collaboration or limited cooperation.