What If: Israel Created a New Corridor to the Euphrates in Syria?

The dream of Greater Israel is not fictional but real, first developed by Theodore Hertzel, the founding father of Zionism, Greater Israel include all lands from the Nile in Egypt to the Euphrates in Iraq. This includes territories from Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, all Jordanian territory, and all historical Palestine. In 2017, the United Nations issued a report indicating that Israel is proceeding with its plans to annex Palestinian lands in the West Bank while keeping Palestinians in severe conditions of isolation and deprivation. Moreover, soldiers of the Israeli army have worn badges showing Greater Israel during military operations in Gaza, indicating that Israel might expand its military operations in the Middle East after ending its military operations in Gaza. The pathway to accomplishing the dream of Greater Israel began in November 2024 when Israel entered the demilitarised zone that separates the occupied Syrian Golan Heights. In this area, Israel began establishing a construction project, paving a road along the borders with Syria. What if the Israeli construction project in Syria is the first step to build a corridor that would connect Israel to the Euphrates, thus making Israel closer to achieve the dream of Greater Israel? What will be the consequences if Israel manages to create this corridor?

The proposed corridor would be a passage that begins in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights and extends through Syria to reach the Euphrates where Kurds, supported by the United States, control all areas in the east of the Euphrates, including all regions on the Syrian-Iraqi border. Although it is not clear where exactly Israel would build this corridor, Turkish media published reports to indicate that the proposed corridor would go in the south of Syria, close to the Jordanian borders, allowing Israel to control the land between the corridor and the Jordanian borders.

If this project is realised, it would enable Israel to control vast areas, reaching the borders of Iraq. Moreover, carving the corridor near the Jordanian borders is driven by security concerns, as Israel remains confident that it would not face threats from Jordan due to the 1994 Israel–Jordan peace treaty. This strategic positioning allows Israel to focus its efforts on countering security challenges that might emerge from Syria.

Firstly, this corridor would make everyone in Israel believe in the possibility of creating Greater Isreal, hence mobilising the public for future wars, and providing sufficient justifications to increase military expenditures instead of other sectors, such as education and health, which might jeopardise the growth of the economy in the future.

Secondly, the corridor would allow Israel to annex new lands and pose security threats to Syria and Iraq in their territory. Since its creation in 1948, Israel has adopted an expansionist military strategy that included annexing new lands, attempting to move battles into Arab territories. This strategy resulted in the occupation of Gaza, the West Bank, Sinai, and the Golan Heights in 1967. The main objective of this Israeli strategy is to move the war into Arab territory, prompting Arab states to prioritise liberating their territories instead of waging an offensive war against Israel. Creating the new corridor further solidifies this strategy, as Syria would be the context for any future confrontation between Israeli and Syrian forces. Moreover, being on the Iraqi borders would allow Israel to launch military operations or airstrikes against Shiite groups, such as the Popular Mobilization Forces that is supported by Iran.

Thirdly, the creation of this corridor could bring economic benefits to Israel if it managed to fortify its presence in Syria, which might not be feasible as Syria is more likely to be actively engaged in fighting against Israeli forces in Syria. These economic benefits include exporting Israeli goods to the east of Syria, where the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) predominate, and importing oil and gas from them. It is expected that Israel would emphasise acting as an intermediate for exporting oil and gas from the areas controlled by the Kurds to Europe through a new pipeline that goes from the Mediterranean in Israel, crossing through Cyprus and Greece, and ending in Europe. This project would face many security challenges from Turkey that experience tensions with both Greece and Cyprus over maritime delimitation, and refuses any exportation of oil and gas from the disputed areas in the Mediterranean.

Fourthly, the new corridor would allow Israel to pose political and military challenges to Turkey. In November 2024, Israel’s newly appointed Foreign Minister, Gidon Sa’ar, stated that Israel must enhance its relations with minorities in the MENA region, including Kurds who have been described as natural allies to Israel. Israel recognises that strengthening relations with Kurds in Syria would result in more deterioration in relations with Turkey. However, Israel may be driven ideologically to proceed in this project after applying a cost-benefit approach that would dictate that the benefits of this project outweigh its costs in the long-term. Moreover, this project would make Israel politically resilient to external military challenges emanating from neighbouring countries through providing Israel with the leverage of using minorities in Syria such as the Druze and Kurds as proxies.

Should Israel succeed in creating the new corridor in Syria, explicit implications will be inflicted on MENA politics.

Firstly, the creation of this corridor might lead to an extensive war between Israel and Syria, as the many armed groups which are operating in Syria would be motivated to battle Israel out of either religious or national loyalty or both.

Secondly, the creation of the new corridor allows for more Israeli support to the Kurdish armed groups in the east of Syria, which could pave the way for the creation of a Kurdish state, hence increasing the potential for dividing the country into an Alawite state on the Mediterranean where Russia has troops, a Sunni state in the central Syria controlled by Sunni opposition groups following their victory against the Syrian Armed Forces, and a Kurdish state in eastern of Syria. Both Turkey and Iran have repeatedly expressed their commitment to the unity of Syria, and share the same interest of preventing Kurds from having a sovereign country.

As a result, it is expected that Turkey and Iran would coordinate efforts against the new corridor. If Turkey managed to coordinate with Russia, it might be able to launch a wide-scale military operation against the Kurdish armed groups in the east of Syria. This would only happen if the U.S. withdraws its forces in Syria. The Turkish military operation would be accompanied with a military siege which might be limited in effectiveness weapons can be smuggled from Kurdistan Iraq to their allies in eastern Syria. To ensure that no new supplies of weapons enter the east of Syria, Turkey would need to coordinate with the Iraqi government to deploy forces on the borders between Kurdistan Iraq and the east of Syria. Despite these efforts, Kurds can get weapons from Israel through the new corridor. Consequently, a military confrontation might occur between Turkey and Israel in Syria as Turkey may target the Israeli route of military supplies to Kurds.

Despite the benefits that the proposed corridor could bring into Israel, its creation might be challenged by several factors.
 

Firstly, since the corridor would be hundreds of kilometres long, Israel may need to create several military bases or barracks to secure control over the road. Deploying forces along the road without air defence may make the Israeli forces an easy target for Syrian forces and other Shiite militias in Iraq. Conversely, deploying air-defence weapons is costly and does not guarantee 100% protection for the Israeli forces. As a result, the creation of this corridor requires Israel to continue and intensify its military operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon to the point where Hezbollah can no longer wage military attacks on Israeli forces in Syria.

Secondly, creating the corridor needs strong financial support as it might cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Since the Israeli economy is at its lowest in years due to wars in Gaza and Lebanon, it might not be able to currently afford such costs, which are not limited to creating the corridor itself but also includes creating the military bases, incorporating advanced surveillance and defence systems, and ensuring that the route is protected and maintained at a high level of security. These elements, combined with potential logistic support and border security, would make the project more expensive than just constructing a simple transportation route. To counter this challenge, Israel may try to promote this corridor economically to get financial support from Western powers. The promotion includes selling ideas about ensuring a line of support to the Kurds, in case the U.S. completely withdrew its forces from Syria, limiting Iranian influence in Syria, and limiting weapons smuggling from Syria territory to Hezbollah. Moreover, Israel might exploit the European need for new energy sources to convince them to support this corridor which could bring oil and gas from the areas controlled by the Kurds in Syria into Europe through Israel.

Thirdly, Syrian armed groups constitute another challenge for the Israeli attempts to create this Corridor. Unlike the Syrian regime that has not commented on the recent Israel crossing of the Alpha line that separates the occupied Golan from Syria, the new political system might be pushed to reply militarily if Israel started creating the new corridor, as this might be the first step in dividing Syria. The Syrian attacks on Israeli forces might be supported by Turkey which perceives any Israeli attempts to deliver persistent support to the Kurdish armed groups, such as the SDF, as a national threat. In October 2024, Turkish president Erdogan said that Israel might attack Turkey after Gaza and Lebanon. While it is not clear what he meant, it is probably about Israeli potential support to Kurdish armed groups operating in Syria.

Fourthly, the Russian presence in Syria might be another obstacle to creating this corridor, even after the fall of the Assad regime. Russia has repeatedly declared its support for the unity of Syria and has also refused to permit Turkey to wage limited military operations against the Kurds. Even after the terrorist attack that targeted Turkish Aerospace Industries in October 2024 and resulted in five fatalities, Russia refused to permit Turkey to use manned fighters to wage airstrikes against Kurdish sites in Syria. It is expected that Russia would stand against the corridor which constitutes a threat to its influence in Syria.

Finally, the creation of a new corridor connects the occupied Syrian Golan Heights to eastern Syria could change the balance of power in the Middle East, as it would not allow Israel to expand its influence to the Iraqi borders, but could drag regional powers further into an ongoing conflict. While the creation of this project might face significant obstacles, including military, financial, and regional resistance, the project could lead to direct confrontations between the different parties that have forces in Syria, especially Turkey and the Kurds.

This analysis is part of the “What If” series, available on AHRC website under the Early Warning Program.

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