Turkish Drones: Expanding Influence and Bringing New Challenges

Turkey has been working on developing its locally-manufactured military capabilities, including drones, for decades, attempting to present itself as a new rising regional power that can affect global politics. Turkey also recognised the importance of drones in supporting ground forces through providing air monitoring services and collecting intelligence about the Kurdistan Working Party (PKK), maximising its motivation to develop locally-made drones. Moreover, due to lack limitations on importing technology from Western powers that share contradictive perspectives with Turkey over issues of refugees, and the Syrian and Libyan Civil Wars. Ankara has paid deep attention to developing its Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), which are publicly known as drones, trying to fill the void of not possessing advanced aircraft such as F-22 or F-35. This analysis explores the different reasons that motivated Turkey to develop UAVs along with the benefits and challenges the Turkish diplomacy experienced.

Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came into office in 2001, it paid deep attention to the development of Turkish drones, hoping that this will open new pathways for developing new air fighters after possessing the needed technological experience that could be obtained from developing drones. This plan has been successful so far as Turkey is currently developing a fifth-generation fighter, known as KAAN, to be the fourth country in the world to manufacture this kind of aircrafts after the United States, Russia, and China.

Generally, three reasons have played a prominent role in shaping the Turkish desire to maintain its military autonomy, including manufacturing drones. Firstly, Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 led to significant geopolitical repercussions, including the United States imposing an arms embargo on Turkey. This embargo fostered a strong sentiment within Turkey that it must be independent militarily from the USA. The American restrictions on military supplies to Turkey were perceived as a threat to Turkey’s sovereignty and political autonomy, highlighting vulnerabilities in its defence posture.

In response, Turkey started focusing on developing its military capabilities to achieve self-sufficiency in defence production. This change was aimed at decreasing reliance on foreign arms suppliers, especially the U.S. while enhancing national security. The experience of the embargo played a significant role in shaping Turkey’s later defence policies and investments in domestic military technologies, influencing its approach to sovereignty and military strategy in the years that followed.

Secondly, in the early 2000s, Turkey aimed to improve its military capabilities by acquiring drones, initially favouring the U.S. company General Atomics for this purpose. However, the deal collapsed mainly because Turkey insisted on equipping the drones with domestically developed cameras. At that time, Turkey lacked the technology and infrastructure to produce these cameras, complicating the negotiations. As a result, Turkey turned to Israel and developed its own camera, which was too heavy for the Israeli-made Heron-1 drone. This mismatch emphasised the limitations of relying on foreign technology and reinforced Turkey’s desire to establish an independent drone production capability.

Turkish insistence on local technology was indicative of its larger objective to enhance self-sufficiency in defence and military procurement. This aim formed part of a strategic effort to lessen reliance on foreign suppliers and strengthen its own defence industry. By prioritising Turkish-made components, Turkey demonstrated its ambition to cultivate a strong indigenous defence sector, which ultimately resulted in substantial investments in research and development over the years.

Thirdly, in mid-2010, the U.S. reluctance to supply Turkey with armed versions of Predator drones acted as a driving force behind Turkey’s decision to establish its own armed drone program. This constraint motivated Turkey to invest in the creation of indigenous military drones capable of executing armed missions. Consequently, Turkey concentrated on developing its technology, resulting in the successful launch of the Bayraktar TB2, which plays an important role in Turkey’s military operations and export strategy. This transition not only strengthened Turkey’s defence capabilities but also diminished its dependence on foreign suppliers for essential military technology.

While many Turkish companies, such as Baykar, Turkish Aero-Space, and STM, manufacture drones, the combat ones produced by Baykar companies, especially Bayraktar TB2 and AKINCI, are in high demand due to low prices and high efficiency that has been proved through affecting the outcomes of some conflicts such as the Libyan Civil War. While there is no published official Turkish record on all countries that imported its locally-made drones, nearly 25 countries imported Bayraktar TB2 and 5 countries imported AKINCI. Currently, Turkish drones are being used in Europe (e.g. Poland and Ukraine), Africa (e.g. Niger, Ethiopia, Somalia, Libya, and Togo), the Middle East (e.g. Qatar, UAE), and Asia (e.g. Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan).

At the moment, Turkish drones have proven their effectiveness in many different battles, especially in Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ukraine, which pushed many countries that suffer from insecurities to import them. These locally made drones have provided Turkey with a new foreign policy tool that it has employed to maximise its external influence.

The rising role of Turkey as drone-exporter has allowed for Turkish expansion through holding new military alliances, especially in fragile countries in Africa such as Libya or countries experiencing political unrest such as Ethiopia, or countries fighting terrorist organisations such as Somalia that is engaged in a fierce war against the terrorist-designated group of al-Shabab. The exportation of drones also motivates the Turkish economy as each selling contract requires the employment of more qualified engineers to ensure submissions are met.

Additionally, selling drones to military clients activates other military sectors as countries that imported drones will be keen to import more weapons from Turkey especially after drones have been proven effective, taken into consideration that the prices of Turkish weapons are lower that its western weapons. For instance, in 2018, Qatar signed a contract to buy drones, ships and armed vehicles. Due to the Qatari confidence in the efficiency of Turkish weapons, it began in 2021 investing in the manufacture of the AKINCI drone.

Likewise, Ukraine imported 20 Bayraktar TB2 in 2022, which has been proven effective against the Russian made-air defence of Pantisir. In 2024, Turkey started building a factory in Ukraine to enhance mutual production of this the Bayraktar TB2, neglecting the military threats coming from Russia. While cooperating with Ukraine, Baykar declared its intention to invest $500 million to develop a new engine for the ACKINCI drone, thus working on two different paths to develop its manufacturing capabilities.

Similarly, in April 2023, Pakistan received 6-7 Akinci drones, and actively deployed them. Months later, it began negotiating with Turkey to purchase anti-tank weapons, which indicates that when a given weapon proves its efficiency, it motivates clients to purchase more from the same source. Signing more contracts for military weapons increases the profits of Turkish companies, hence allowing them to proceed in their action plans of developing more advanced weapons.

Drone diplomacy has significantly affected Turkish foreign policy by allowing for the building of new partnerships centred on the supply of spare parts, munitions, training, and technical support. The growing military collaboration between Turkey and Ukraine illustrates this dynamic, as Turkey works on acquiring the experience of building engines from Ukraine that inherited strong military experiences from the Soviet Union. The Turkish acquisition of those capabilities won’t only push forward the industry of drones but also will motivate Turkey to work on producing a local engine for its locally manufactured aircraft, known as KAAN that uses engines made by the U.S. company of General Electric. Additionally, Turkey has leveraged drones to enhance its foreign policy in Africa, strengthening ties with nations like Ethiopia and Morocco, where it has strategic economic and geopolitical interests.

Turkish drones are known for their lower prices which enabled Turkey to export them to many countries that need efficient drones for combat and intelligence purposes and can’t afford to buy expensive drones. The price of Bayraktar TB2 is approximately $5 million compared to $20 million for the American MQ-9 Reaper and $28 million for the advanced Protector RG Mk 1. Turkish drones deliver military capabilities similar to those of Western drones at a lower price. This competitive pricing has enabled Turkey to emerge as a key player in a market traditionally dominated by the U.S., Israel, and China. Currently, many NATO members have expressed their interest in purchasing Turkish drones, including the UK and Latvia. This high demand has bolstered the Turkish defence industry and contributed to the Turkish economy, with drone sales contributing at least $700 million and driving an additional $3.2 billion in defence exports.

While Turkey maintains a non-conditional approach in exporting drones, attempting to attract more clients, its global reputation might be affected especially if these drones have been used by the importers in war crimes. For instance, Nigeria used Turkish-made drones to attack a rally of civilians, which resulted in the killing of 85 civilians in December 2022. In such a case, Turkey’s regional and global opponents might use this a justification to impose more limits on the industry of Turkish drones. Additionally, the relationship between Turkey and the USA may be jeopardised in the future. Traditionally, the USA has imposed conditionality on drones’ importers. With Turkey providing cheap alternatives, it is expected that the sales of the USA drones may decrease, and this will push the USA to exercise more pressure on the Turkish industry of drones through imposing more limitation on the usage of Turkish drones to the American Satellite navigation system (GPS). The U.S. can also impose more sanctions on other pieces being exported to Turkey such as GNC22 navigation radio.

Despite the political and economic benefits Turkey obtained from exporting drones to conflict-affected countries, it experiences some challenges in maintaining influence in other countries. For instance, Turkey exported drones to Somalia and accuses Ethiopia publicly of equipping the terrorist group al-Shabab, and this poses a challenge for Ankara to balance relations between these two countries. A similar situation has occurred in Ukraine, as Turkey exported drones to Ukraine that used them to attack Russian troops, which constituted a real threat for Turkey to balance relations with Russia. While these drones have played a vital role in the beginning of the Russia Ukraine War, their role has witnessed a setback due to Russia improving its air defences.

To conclude, the Turkish development of drones has been driven by a desire for military autonomy and self-sufficiency in defence production, particularly in response to past arms embargoes and limitations in acquiring foreign technology. The successful deployment and export of its UAVs have not only enhanced Turkey’s military capabilities but also expanded its influence globally, especially in conflict-affected regions. However, this strategy brings new challenges, including managing diplomatic relations with countries experience complex political situations.

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