In the wake of the recent NATO summit, European leaders have committed to a landmark pledge: raising defence spending to 5% of GDP. Hailed by its backers as a historic move, the agreement reflects a sharp shift in European threat perception, driven not only by Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine but also by the renewed pressure from Washington under the return of the Trump presidency. The "Trump effect" has reignited long-standing fears over the reliability of U.S. security guarantees, pushing Europe to take on greater defence responsibilities.   But while the pledge signals a tougher European posture, it raises pressing concerns. Can Europe realistically meet such ambitious targets without undermining the very democratic model it seeks to defend? As defence budgets grow, many fear this could come at the cost of welfare, social cohesion, and democratic checks, exposing the continent to a deeper risk: the creeping militarisation of European politics and the erosion of its democratic dividend.

Between June 13 and 14, 2025, Israel executed one of the most daring and sophisticated military operations in its contemporary history: a multi-pronged aerial strike that penetrated deep into Iranian sovereign territory in an unprecedented fashion. The offensive targeted critical nuclear infrastructure, including the Natanz and Fordow enrichment facilities, alongside additional military installations near Isfahan. Furthermore, the operation struck key airbases integral to Iran’s air defence network, most notably Hamadan and Tabriz airfields. In parallel, Israeli forces targeted senior leadership within both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the conventional military, with subsequent intelligence assessments confirming direct hits and casualties among Iran’s high command.   Iran's response, though swift, bore the hallmarks of operational improvisation. Seeking to reassert deterrence and project resilience, Tehran launched over one hundred unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on the same day, primarily of the Shahed-136 and Shahed-131 variants. These drones traversed approximately 2,000 kilometres through Iraqi and Syrian airspace. However, the majority failed to reach Israeli territory. Instead, they were intercepted by a multi-layered defensive network composed of Jordanian, Saudi, and Israeli air defence systems, all heavily supported by U.S. early-warning and tracking technologies. A large number were neutralized over Iraq’s Anbar province and the deserts of Jordan, while others were downed over northern Saudi Arabia.   On June 14, Iran escalated by launching its principal retaliatory strike in the form of a large-scale, coordinated ballistic missile attack. Over 150 ballistic missiles were deployed, prominently including Ghadr-110 (with a range of up to 3,000 km), Khorramshahr, and Sejjil-2—among the most advanced systems in Iran’s medium-range missile arsenal. These missiles targeted multiple sites deep inside Israeli territory. A notable strike occurred near Israel’s Ministry of Defence compound in the Kirya complex in central Tel Aviv, where one missile reportedly caused structural damage and minor injuries, though no fatalities among military personnel were confirmed. Additional missiles struck civilian infrastructure in Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, and Rishon LeZion, injuring several individuals—one critically—with the majority suffering only mild to moderate wounds.   Despite the magnitude of the missile barrage, the strategic yield fell significantly short of Tehran’s expectations. This underperformance prompted Iranian authorities to broaden the scope of their confrontation, issuing explicit warnings that U.S. military assets across the region—particularly in the Gulf—would henceforth be considered legitimate targets. These threats referenced high-value installations such as Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates, and U.S. military positions in Iraq, including Ain al-Asad and Camp Victoria in Baghdad, as well as naval facilities in Bahrain.   From Iran’s strategic vantage point, any U.S. involvement—especially in reinforcing Israeli air defences—constitutes direct participation in the hostilities. This rationale is now used to justify Tehran’s threats to strike American military positions across the Gulf. The implications of this shift are profound: for the first time since 2020, the prospect of open military confrontation in the Persian Gulf has become a credible geopolitical scenario. The regional deterrence equation, long balanced on latent threat and calculated ambiguity, has now entered a phase of dangerous volatility.   This analysis seeks to offer a comprehensive examination of the strategic motivations underpinning Iran’s threats to target U.S. military bases in the Gulf region. By synthesizing operational data—namely, Iran’s patterns of ballistic missile and drone deployment—with broader structural dynamics of regional and international power distribution, to elucidate the strategic logic through which American military installations in the Gulf emerge as priority targets within Iran’s evolving deterrence doctrine.

Sports diplomacy is not something new. It can be traced back to the ancient Olympic Games, when Greek city-states suspended conflicts to compete peacefully. The modern Olympic movement, revived in 1896, was based on similar principles of fostering global unity. However, sports have also been used to serve political agendas, such as the 1936 Olympics in Berlin, during which Nazi Germany turned the games into a propaganda tool. In other cases, sports played an important diplomatic role to ease tensions between countries. The Ping-Pong diplomacy, for instance, facilitated communication between the U.S. and China in 1971, which later paved the way for President Richard Nixon’s historic visit in 1972. This analysis explores how sports diplomacy contributes to easing political tensions between countries.